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INTRODUCTION
The stakes at play in modem-day patent infringement suits can be worth
hundreds of millions of dollars. Just ask the executives of Research In Mo-
tion, Ltd. ("RIM"). In "one of the most celebrated intellectual property
showdowns in U.S. history,"' NTP, Inc. sued RIM, the Canadian corporation
that developed the popular BlackBerry system, for patent infringement.2
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Michigan School of Law, and to Omri Ben-Shahar, Eric Dannenmaier, Graeme Dinwoodie,
Rebecca Eisenberg, Ted Field, Tim Holbrook, Rob Katz, Andy Klein, Jessica Litman, Gerard
Magliocca, Mike Meurer, David Orentlicher, Mike Pitts, Antony Page, Florence Roisman,
Carlton Waterhouse, Mark West, and George Wright, and special thanks to Chris Powers,
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I. Barrie McKenna, Paul Waldie & Simon Avery, Patently Absurd, THE GLOBE &
MAIL (Apr. 5, 2009), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/archives/article8l409.ece.
2. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 2d 423 (D. Va. 2002). "Patent
trolls" have often been defined as those who own but do not use patents other than as a means
to extract rents in the form of royalties or litigation damages from potential infringers. See,
e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive
Advantage, 47 Am. Bus. L.J. 727, 751 (2010); Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First
American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 194
(2011). Although the inventor behind NTP's patents apparently did try at first to market his
wireless email technology, NTP later was formed as a non-practicing entity. McKenna et al.,
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NTP, an alleged "patent troll," maintained that several of its wireless email
communication patents covered various configurations of RIM's BlackBerry
technology and that RIM was therefore violating NTP's rights by producing
and selling the BlackBerry without NTP's permission. After spending over
five years in court and settlement negotiations, RIM ultimately paid NTP
$612.5 million to settle the case.'
How could RIM have made such an expensive mistake? After all, NTP's
patents were all of public record. Shouldn't RIM simply have done its
homework and realized that its BlackBerry system was running afoul of
NTP's intellectual property rights? As is typically true of patent infringe-
ment cases, there were many reasons RIM ended up paying such a large
price for infringing NTP's patents. But many critics complain that a lack of
clarity as to patent scope turns almost all major patent infringement cases
into costly messes.
In particular, critics of the patent system argue that patents do a poor job
of specifying what does and does not constitute infringement of their
claims' scope. And in RIM and NTP's case, the parties did in fact spend a
good deal of their time before both the trial and appellate courts wrangling
over the exact scope of NTP's patent rights and, specifically, whether NTP's
patents actually covered RIM's BlackBerry system. The proper interpreta-
tion of the patents' claims consumed several pages of the Federal Circuit's
decision, including extended discussions on the meaning of the terms "elec-
tronic mail system," "originating processor," and "gateway switch."' Such
extended debates over patent claim interpretation are hardly unique. Patent
infringement cases have famously hinged on the meanings of even simpler
words, such as "a," "or," "to," "on," "about," "including," and "through."'
Despite the fact that most people familiar with the patent system view
patents as an area of law dealing with science and technology, not linguis-
tics, distinctions about the meaning of words are routine in patent litigation.6
Patents are written documents, and the words used in a patent's claims
define the legally binding effect of the patent owner's rights. Accordingly,
patent claim construction-how we interpret the meaning of that part of the
patent that defines its scope-takes center stage in nearly every suit alleging
infringement of a patent, causing uncertainty as to the outcome of the case.'
supra note 1; Stephanie Stoughton, How Patent Suit Became Judge's Nightmare, TMCNET
(Nov. 20, 2005), http://news.tmcnet.com/news/2005/nov/1209795.htm.
3. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Tom
Krazit & Anne Broache, BlackBerry Saved, CNET NEWs (Mar. 3, 2006), http://news.cnet.com/
BlackBerry-saved/2100-1047_3-6045880.html; Stoughton, supra note 2.
4. NTP, Inc., 418 F.3d at 1294-1311.
5. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 29, 53 (2005).
6. Id.
7. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Post? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing
Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MItC. L. REV. 105, 106 (2005); S. Jay Plager, Chal-
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Neither patentees nor alleged infringers know the exact scope of a patent
until a court interprets that patent's claims as a matter of law.8
To those who have studied the law, this type of ambiguity is common-
place. From criminal statutes and tax regulations to clauses in contracts and
wills, legal documents cannot always anticipate every situation to which the
rules in that document might apply. Most of the time what does or does not
fit within the meaning of a statute or a contract will be fairly clear. But those
instances in which it is not so clear are the most likely to wind up in court.
Courts must therefore interpret the unclear statute, regulation, contract, or
will after the fact to determine how it should apply. Even bright-line rules
and airtight contracts are porous at their edges.9 As a result, the outcome of
certain cases may depend on fine distinctions about the meaning of words
and even punctuation.
For many critics, such linguistic ambiguity in the scope of patent rights
is troubling and yet particularly common in areas such as biotechnology,
computer software, and business method patents.'o These critics complain
that both patent holders and potential infringers too often risk millions of
dollars over patent claim language that must be interpreted by a court." The
purpose of patent claims, the critics argue, is to demarcate clearly the
boundaries of the patent holder's rights. Each demarcation also gives notice
to others of where the patent holder's rights end. In other words, patent
claims are supposed to draw linguistic lines around the patented invention.
The critics therefore liken patent claims not to statutes, contracts, or
other legal writings, but to property boundary lines and, in particular, "tan-
gible" property lines, by which they seem mostly to mean real property
boundaries. 2 Under this analogy, they argue, patent claim language should
lenges for Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-First Century: Indeterminacy and Other
Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 71.
8. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1762.
9. Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective
on Precision in the Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 543 (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertain-
ty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
341, 345-46 (1991).
10. E.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 172-73 (2008); Burk & Lemley,
supra note 7, at 1760.
Ii. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, passim.
12. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 8-11; John F. Duffy, Intellectual Proper-
ty Isolationism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1077, 1085 (2005); Paul J.
Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 487-88 (2006); F.
Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach
to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 426 (2006); Chris R.
McManis, Re-Engineering Patent Law: The Challenge of New Technologies, 2 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'Y 109, 109 (2000); Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59
CATH. U. L. REV. 61, 65-69, 109 (2009); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1793-94 (2007).
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be as unambiguous as real property boundaries are." As RIM and NTP's
case and thousands of other examples illustrate, patent claims fall far short
of this ideal. Some critics even argue that patent claim boundaries are so
uncertain that they threaten to undermine the very purpose of the patent sys-
tem to incentivize investment in technological progress. 4 The Federal
Circuit itself has repeatedly expressed concern over the uncertainty of patent
claims."
For the most part, the analogy between patents and property is under-
standable. Patents are often viewed as property because they share many of
property's hallmarks, including the all-important right to exclude.' 6 But to
jump from these similarities to the conclusion that patent claims should be
as clear as tangible property boundaries is a misleading generalization.
As any first-year law student can explain, "property" is just a legal con-
clusion, a variable bundle of rights asserted over a "thing" or a resource but
separate from the particular thing or resource itself, the latter of which is
merely the res of those property rights." Although it is not entirely clear,
most critics of patent claim clarity seem to be comparing patent claims not
to the legal interests in a property res but to the boundaries of the particular
tangible things or resources that the res comprises. In particular, the critics
most often seem to compare patent claims to fences or the metes and bounds
of real property, rather than to easements, leaseholds, or other legal interests
in property.
Of course, an important question is why critics should compare patent
claims with only "tangible" property boundaries. Property rights can be
asserted over a wide variety of things and resources, many of which are nei-
ther "tangible" nor physical. For example, property interests in corporations
and partnerships, in financial obligations, and even in property interests
themselves are common forms of "intangible" property. 8 Why critics do not
13. E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, passim; ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER,
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 171 (2004); Plager, supra note 7,
at 72; David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REv. 223, 259 (2008); see also Burk & Lemley,
supra note 7, at 1744.
14. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, passim; JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 13,
passim; John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their "Interpretive Com-
munity:" A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 323
(2008); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?,
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 28 (2001); Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the
Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 759-60 (1999).
15. Markman v. Westview Instrs., Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
16. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm,
54 DUKE L.J. 1, 52-58 (2004).
17. Juliet M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law, 62 FLA. L.
REv. 159, 178-79 (2010); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1719, 1728(2004).
18. Smith, supra note 12, at 1744.
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compare patent claim clarity to clarity in defining these other, non-tangible
types of property res is somewhat puzzling. Even the critics themselves are
quick to concede that part of the problem of comparing patent claims with
real property boundaries is that the inventive concepts protected under
patents are obviously intangible and therefore more difficult to delineate.
Faulting the patent system simply because patent claims are necessarily
more ambiguous than real property or other "tangible" boundaries thus begs
the question: are these two types of "property" truly comparable? The com-
parison between real property boundaries and patent boundaries necessarily
assumes that real property boundaries are clear and that patent boundaries
therefore should-and can-be as clear as those in real property. Even
accepting the debatable idea that real property boundaries are clear,19 one
cannot simply assume that the demarcation of real property boundaries is
the proper framework for evaluating uncertainty in patent claims.
Rather, the initial question should be: are patents so similar to plats for
land that their respective boundaries should be defined with the same
clarity? Or do these two versions of "property" inevitably differ in ways that
affect the clarity with which we can expect to define them? Many scholars
have already questioned the value of the patent-as-property analogy in a
variety of other contexts.2 0 This Article concludes that, given the intrinsic
differences between patents and property, patent claims are always more
uncertain than the boundaries of tangible property. This is by no means a
revolutionary statement to the extent it suggests that a fair degree of uncer-
tainty in patent claims is inevitable.2 1 What this Article adds to the
discussion, however, is the idea that our current patent claiming system is
not necessarily "broken" simply because it yields less certainty than real
property systems.
Indeed, any comparison between the two types of regimes is mislead-
ing, for the assets protected and the purposes of the two regimes are
completely different. First, one oft-noted difference is that the assets pro-
tected under the patent system, unlike those protected under real property,
are not only intangible but also highly conceptual, abstract, and functional in a
way that defies clear definition. This is a problem that seems to be most com-
monly cited with regard to biotechnology, computer software, and business
19. See John Mixon & Gordon Otto, Continuous Quality Improvement, Law, and Legal
Education, 43 EMORY L.J. 393, 423 (1994) (citing Myres S. McDougal & John W. Brabner-
Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression, 48 YALE L.J. 1125 passim (1939)) (characterizing
the U.S. land title system as "inefficient").
20. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031 passim (2005) (criticizing comparisons between social and private costs of patents
versus real property); cf. Adam Mossoff, Property Metaphors and Myths in Patent Law
(2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that comparing infringement to
trespass on property is misleading); Newman, supra note 12, at 104-19.
21. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1744; Schwartz, supra note 13, at 259.
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method patents. 22 As explained below, however, abstract patent claiming is
certainly not unique to any one area of technology but rather applies to all
patentable inventions, albeit to varying degrees. 23
Second, because the res of patent "property" rights are always novel and
unique, claim drafters must find equally novel ways to describe their inven-
tions and cannot simply rely on previously established points of reference. 24
Third, propertization of a patent asset is almost immediately defeasible, by
design, reflecting the differing purposes of the patent system and real prop-
erty systems. The patent system is designed to incentivize the creation and
expeditious release of new technological ideas as non-consumable goods,
not to manage an existing plot of land as a rivalrous good. 25 Finally, the un-
predictability of the future value and uses of a patent, and even the
terminology by which it is defined, make patent claims highly uncertain
compared to real property plats.
Uncertainty in patents stems from such different sources that it simply
cannot be compared to uncertainty in real property boundaries.26 Given that
reducing uncertainty is costly, the optimal level of certainty in patent bound-
aries is unlikely to be the same as the optimal level of certainty in tangible
property boundaries.
An alternative analogy gaining currency among some scholars is there-
fore to view modern patent claims not as a land surveyor might but as
lawyers might. Instead of comparing patent claims to real property plats, it
is more apt to compare patent claims to statutes, contracts, regulations, and
other complex legal documents that may be clear for many purposes but
inevitably require some interpretation at their margins. 27
This shift in analogy is similar to what some refer to as the shift from
"rules of exclusion" to "rules of governance." 28 Rules of exclusion embody
the classical notion of property by pinpointing the asset from which one
wishes to exclude all others. Rules of governance, on the other hand, are
more familiar in the context of contracts, statutes, and regulations, for they
fixate not so much on a particular asset but rather on the permitted and pro-
hibited uses of an asset or on conduct untied to any particular asset.29
22. E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 172-73; Burk & Lemley, supra note 7,
at 1760.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 98-101.
24. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1749; Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual
Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 726 (2009). See generally Clarissa Long, Information Costs
in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 468 (2004) (noting that when property res is
unusual and "non-paradigmatic," it lacks well-known referents and therefore is more difficult
to describe).
25. Smith, supra note 12, at 1744.
26. But see Duffy, supra note 12, at 1090-91 (criticizing intellectual property excep-
tionalism and efforts to distinguish intellectual property from other types of property).
27. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1761-62; Golden, supra note 14, at 323.
28. Fromer, supra note 24, at 725, 730; Smith, supra note 17, passim.
29. Fromer, supra note 24, at 725.
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Patent claims give notice of not just what patent holders regard as their
exclusive assets but also how all others may use their own assets without
infringing the patentee's rights. Patent claims can thus be seen not only as
the boundaries of a property res but also as rules of governance for the use
of others' property. Historically speaking, patent claims have intentionally
been patterned after rules, albeit not so much as a rejection of the property
paradigm of patent rights but rather as a means to achieve more certainty in
patent boundaries.
Even the most carefully drafted statute, contract, or other rule of gov-
ernance, however, is limited in its ability to anticipate all situations.30
Depending on the unpredictability of circumstances to which the rule might
be applied, the rule may have to be drafted with more or less specificity and
therefore more or less need for interpretation. The requisite novelty of
patentable concepts as well as the unpredictability of future developments in
the field lead not only to highly complex rules of governance but also to
rules that are necessarily more flexible and therefore more vague. Patent
claims thus fall at the more unpredictable end of the spectrum.
Indeed, given the design and purpose of the patent system, patent claims
are inevitably uncertain because they must be adapted, often through post
hoc interpretation, to the situation at hand. In this way, patents can be seen
as lying along a spectrum between rules and standards, with rules specifying
the law in detail ex ante and standards setting only the rough contours of the
law, leaving further elaboration to be developed later during application.
Much of not only modern patent claiming but also patent law more
generally can be seen through this lens."
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the basics of patent
claiming, the traditional view of claims as real property deeds, and why un-
certainty as to the boundaries of those deeds is considered undesirable. Part
II critiques the analogy between real property deeds and patent claims, high-
lighting in particular the requisite novelty and conceptual nature of the
patent res, the differences between the purposes of the patent system and
real property regimes, and the effect of these different purposes on the ex-
pected predictability of patent boundaries. Part III then changes the analogy
from patent claims as property deeds to patent claims as rules of govern-
ance, noting the advantages and limitations of this analogy. The Article
concludes with a discussion of patent claims not just as rules of governance
30. See Golden, supra note 14, at 324 n.14 ("Given that patent rights exist at the
evolving edges of technology and, like contracts, effectively 'regulate the future,' it is debata-
ble whether demands for certainty in patent scope can ever be satisfied.") (citing Richard A.
Posner, The law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1582
(2005)).
31. Although suggested above as a possibility, whether patent claims can more profita-
bly be compared to intangible property boundaries as rules of exclusion, rules of governance,
or even some tertium quid is not considered here.
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but also as blends of rules and standards in their need to anticipate often
unpredictable circumstances.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW: PATENT CLAIMS AS PROPERTY DEEDS
Patents rights are in many ways property-like entitlements and are
intended to serve at least two of the same major purposes as property rights.
First, patents are designed to incentivize investments in developing new
technologies by granting patentees the property-like right to exclude all
others from their technologies, albeit for a limited period of time. In fact, the
Patent Act explicitly states that "patents shall have the attributes of personal
property."32 Second, patents are designed to demarcate patentees' property
rights by establishing the boundaries of those rights." The claims of a patent
are akin to the metes and bounds of real property and serve to give the pub-
lic notice of the property res's boundaries and what would constitute
trespass.34 Certainty in patent boundaries is desirable because it would pro-
vide patent holders some reassurances in investing in their rights of
exclusion and allow for easy resolution of any conflicts over those rights,
leading to greater efficiency overall. 5 The patent system, however, is often
criticized for providing too little certainty as to patent boundaries."
In the case of a patent, the right to exclude covers the right to prevent
others from "making, using, offering for sale, or selling the [patented] in-
vention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States."3 These rights last for a period of only twenty years from the
time the patent application is filed.38 The purpose of this system comes from
the Constitution itself, which grants Congress the power to "promote the
Progress of . . . the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discoveries." 39
Scientific research and discovery can involve a sizeable investment of
resources. For example, economists estimate that bringing a single pharma-
32. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2011).
33. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
247, 254 (1994); Heald, supra note 12, at 475; Nard, supra note 14, at 759.
34. E.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1744; Dam, supra note 33, at 254; Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 839, 845 (1990); Nard, supra note 14, at 759.
35. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 30-45; JAFFE & LERNER, supra
note 13, at 171; Gerald Sobel, Patent Scope and Competition: Is the Federal Circuit's
Approach Correct?, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 5 (2002).
36. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 13, at 171.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1997).
38. Id.; id. § 27 1 (a). Prior to 1995, the patent term was seventeen years from the date of
issuance. Id. § 154(a), 271(a) (1988) (amended 1994).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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ceutical product to the market currently costs upwards of $800 million.4 No
rational market actor would invest this kind of money without some signifi-
cant chance to earn returns on that investment. By enjoying exclusive power
to exploit their inventions for at least a limited period of time, inventors can
protect their investments from free riding or outright theft by others.
Because inventive ideas and other intellectual goods are intangible,
however, they are difficult to protect by physical or other non-legal means of
exclusion. Unlike the owner of real property or other tangible goods, an in-
ventor cannot simply build a fence around her inventive concept or lock it
away in a safe.41 Absent legal protections, her inventive idea can be freely
exploited by anyone who can replicate it, with no risk of exhaustion.42 The
non-excludable and non-possessory (or "non-rivalrous") nature of intellec-
tual goods often leads commentators to analogize them to the economic
concept of "public goods."43 Patents, copyrights, and other forms of intellec-
tual property in theory at least solve the public goods problem by providing
exclusivity through legal rights."
The exclusivity of patents allows patent holders to price at supra-
competitive levels in markets where their inventions have few or no close
substitutes, thereby placing patentees in a better position to recoup their in-
vestments and even to earn significant profits. In this way, the patent system
allocates to patentees a share of the overall social welfare their inventions
create. Patent law is based on the theory that without the possibility of such
returns, the market would lack adequate incentives to invest in technological
progress.4 5 In addition, patent rights are fully alienable, in whole or in part,
as a way to encourage transfer to a higher-valuing user. The rights are thus
private and market-based in a way that not only increases their liquidity but
also allows the market to assess their value.46
Importantly, another purpose of patents is to provide public notice of
the scope of the technological development over which the patentee claims
exclusive rights.47 Like property rights, patent rights are in rem and therefore
40. Henry Grabowski, Are the Economics of Pharmaceutical Research and Develop-
ment Changing?, 22 PHARMACOECONOMICS 15, 16 (2004).
41. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF




45. See generally BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10 (discussing patent law's apparent
success in this regard); Lemley, supra note 20 (analyzing whether capture of full social value
is necessary for this incentive effect).
46. Carrier, supra note 16, at 58-62. Until recently, injunctive relief was also a com-
mon remedy for patent infringement, but it may be somewhat less common after the Supreme
Court's decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
47. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 54 (2005); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for
Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C.
L. REV. 55, 69 (2003).
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good against all comers, regardless of relationship or agreement. Also like
property rights, liability for infringing patent rights is strict and applies
regardless of intent or even awareness of the patent.48 The rights granted
under patents are publicly recorded to provide notice and give potential in-
fringers at least the opportunity to discover how they might run afoul of
another's rights. 49
Merely drawing a picture of one's invention or describing examples of it
does not necessarily give others adequate notice of what might constitute
infringement of a particular patent, however. Without a doubt, examples of
the invention and explanations of its technological background are often
necessary to understand the invention. Patentees will routinely include such
materials in what is called the "specification" of a patent. 0 These kinds of
materials nonetheless do not inform the public of what specifically belongs
to the patentee under the patent.
Rather, under a patents-as-property analogy, the actual metes and
bounds of the res of that particular patentee's property right over her inven-
tion are set forth in the "claims" of the patent.5' The claims are detailed
descriptions of the property res, found at the end of a patent and "particular-
ly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention."52 A single patent may contain multiple
claims of varying breadth, each describing variations on the underlying in-
vention.
The claims of a patent thus inform others of the "property" the patent
covers and, just as importantly, what it does not cover. To use technology
that is claimed within a patent, subsequent inventors must license the patent,
invest resources in "designing around" it to produce a non-infringing alter-
native, or forgo competing with the patented invention altogether.
Technology not claimed within a patent, on the other hand, can be used
freely by anyone, including subsequent inventors who may invent or
discover their own advances. 5 4 The patent system thereby guards against the
assertion of exclusive rights over technology that patentees did not in fact
48. Cf Moringiello, supra note 17, at 180 (describing property rights by the extent to
which they bind persons other than parties to the instrument conveying the right); Smith,
supra note 12, at 1744-45, 1784-85, 1793, 1796-97, 1800.
49. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 31.
50. 35 U.S.C. § 111(1997).
51. E.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1744 ("[W]ords of a claim form a sort of
conceptual 'fence' that marks the edge of the patentee's rights."); Dam, supra note 33, at 254;
Merges & Nelson, supra note 34, at 845; Nard, supra note 14, at 759, 785-86.
52. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010).
53. John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and
Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 449 (1997); Jay P. Kesan & Marc Banik, Patents
as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives to Disclose
Prior Art, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & Pot'Y 23, 25 (2000); Nard, supra note 14, at 759.
54. Cotropia, supra note 47, at 54.
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invent or that otherwise does not meet the law's stringent patentability
requirements.55
Patent claims and how they are interpreted, therefore, take on singular
importance. Patent claim interpretations are usually dispositive of both
whether an alleged infringer has infringed the patent and whether the
patent holder is asserting valid patent coverage. In this way patent claim
construction is also dispositive of a patent's strength, or scope, which in
turn determines the patent's possible economic value.56 As famously said
by Judge Giles Rich, one of the founding fathers of modern patent law, "the
name of the game is the claim."5 When a patent's claims are uncertain, its
legal effect is uncertain as well.
When we speak of "uncertainty" in the law generally, we usually mean
ex ante ambiguity as to how the law will apply to any given fact pattern.
Uncertainty may arise from a lack of clarity in how the law is defined, such
as when the law is vaguely worded or incomplete in its content. Similarly,
uncertainty may arise due to ambiguities about the facts to which a law must
be applied. Finally, uncertainty may arise from doubts about how to inter-
pret a law or how to apply a law to a given set of facts." Regardless of its
cause, uncertainty in the law ultimately means uncertainty about the law's
consequences.59 Both potential plaintiffs and defendants and even the courts
may be unable to predict ex ante what outcome the law will dictate.60
Given that a patent's claims define the value of the patent, uncertainty
as to the scope of those claims also makes the value of the patent uncertain.
That uncertainty may in turn discourage inventors and their investors from
making optimal investments in research and development or in the market-
ing and other commercialization necessary to bring an invention to the
public.6' Predictability as to the meaning of a patent's claims, on the other
hand, assures that no nasty surprises will crop up if and when the claims are
applied ex post.
55. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and Information Costs, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 69 (2005). For more detail on patentability requirements, see
infra text accompanying note 144.
56. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1795; Lemley, supra note 7, at 102 ("[O]nce the
court construes the claims, most patent cases settle, and those that do not are often decided on
summary judgment.") (footnote omitted).
57. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1539 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (quoting Giles Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims-
American Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499, 501 (1990)).
58. Hadfield, supra note 9, at 542. Uncertainty as to legal outcomes can also arise from
probabilistic detection or enforcement, id., but a more detailed discussion of these sources of
uncertainty lies outside the scope of this Article.
59. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1749.
60. Hadfield, supra note 9, passim. The likelihood is that any given outcome will in-
stead fall along a probability distribution. Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 13 (1983); Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Errors and the Functioning of Tort Liability, 13
SUP. CT. EcoN. REV. 165, 166 (2005).
61. Golden, supra note 14, at 323.
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Likewise, if the interpretation of a patent's claims is uncertain, a com-
petitor in the same field may not be certain of the bounds of the patent and
how to avoid trespassing them. 62 As a result, the competitor may under-
invest in avoiding infringement and even unwittingly reinvent what another
has already patented. Alternatively, a risk-averse competitor may over-invest
in avoiding infringement, possibly by staying out of the field altogether and
thereby decreasing competitive alternatives in the market.63 Unpredictability
is also thought to raise both transaction costs and the likelihood of litigation
due to the lack of a stable and consistent background against which parties
may negotiate over patents.64 When suits for infringement do occur, unpre-
dictability in patent claim meaning increases judicial burdens and decreases
the likelihood of settlement."
To be sure, despite the risks of uncertainty, many situations depending
on patent claim scope do not seem to be unduly affected by uncertainty. For
example, most cases either settle or result in renegotiated licensing terms,
largely avoiding the issue of the claims' exact scope.66 in other cases, com-
mon sense or common knowledge dictates what falls clearly within or
without the boundaries of the patent.67
Nevertheless, many critics still worry whether the current patent
claiming system leads to adequate certainty in patent scope. One popular
way by which critics try to measure that certainty is by comparing it to the
predictability supposedly enjoyed in defining real property boundaries, and
the conclusions have not been favorable.68 First, if the patent system were as
clear as real property regimes in notifying potential trespassers of what has
been claimed, innovators like RIM would not be caught in unknowing in-
fringement of another's patent rights.69 Second, the uncertainty of patents
means they are difficult to enforce without costly litigation, thus lowering
the patents' value and imposing costs on others.70 The prolonged five-year
lawsuit between RIM and NTP is a prime example of the resources spent by
parties and courts in establishing the boundaries of a given patent. Third,
critics argue that the uncertainty of patent claim meaning deters investments
62. Newman, supra note 12, at 65-66.
63. Nard, supra note 14, at 788-90.
64. Gregory D. Leibold, In Juries We Do Nor Trust: Appellate Review of Patent-
Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 623, 645-46 (1996).
65. Golden, supra note 14, at 323.
66. Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design,
115 YALE L.J. 814, 817-18 (2006).
67. E.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1782 ("Of course, some infringement cases
will prove to be blatant, free-riding misappropriation of the inventor's contribution ..... ); see
also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 152-53 (describing chemical patent claims as
"straightforward").
68. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, passim.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1-2, 152-53; JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 13, at 171; Golden, supra note 14,
at 323; Moore, supra note 14, at 28; Nard, supra note 14, at 761-63.
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in technology due to the high costs of enforcing patents or defending against
patent infringement. The failure of patent claims to match the certainty of
real property regimes thus imposes costs that are a drag on invention and
innovation."
Even the critics, however, recognize that perfect symmetry between the
supposed clarity of real property boundaries and the clarity of patent claims
is, at best, an ideal.72 Patent "property" and real property differ in ways that
significantly affect any analogy between the two. The most often recognized
difference between intellectual "property" and tangible forms of property
such as real estate is that intellectual property covers res that are intangible.
Real and personal property rights protect tangible commodities such as land,
buildings, and vehicles. The boundaries of these commodities are defined by
the commodities' physical characteristics, including directions and distances
from landmarks or other physical points of reference.7 1 Patents, on the other
hand, protect non-physical, intangible concepts, techniques, and ideas. 74
Such intangibility does not lend itself well to clear delineation, for it is
"hard to draw a boundary around an idea."75 Both the inherent limitations of
language in expressing abstractions and the lack of physical referents for
demarcating boundaries lead to a situation in which, although we may know
exactly what we mean, we cannot express that meaning in a way that relia-
bly can be communicated."
Even a comparison that takes into account the distinction between
tangible and intangible property fails fully to appreciate the difference
between property and patents, moreover. The problem is not just that
patentable ideas are intangible or even that the technologies involved are
often complex.77 As the next Part explains, patentable ideas are intangible
not just because they are ideas but also because they are ideas about how
71. Lemley, supra note 20, at 1060-62.
72. E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 5.
73. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 516 (6th ed. 2008).
74. E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 9-10; Lemley, supra note 20, passim
(distinguishing intellectual property from "tangible property"); Newman, supra note 12, at 65.
75. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 32; Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at
1744 ("[Claim construction may be inherently indeterminate: it may simply be impossible to
cleanly map words to things."); Golden, supra note 14, at 324 n.14; Paul M. Janicke, On the
Causes of Unpredictability of Federal Circuit Decisions in Patent Cases, 3 Nw. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 93, 97 (2005) (asserting that the unpredictability of claim construction is, "to a
large extent, an expected byproduct of a legal system that tries to express technical exclusivity
with words"); Schwartz, supra note 13, at 259.
76. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 55 ("[l1t is much more complicated to
map the boundaries of a technology from a verbal description than it is to map a plot of land
using a standardized surveyor's description."); Janicke, supra note 75, at 97 (and sources cited
therein); Schwartz, supra note 13, at 259-60; see also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562-63 (1992).
77. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 55-56 (suggesting that "[p]erhaps in an
earlier time, when technology was simpler, [certainty in patent claim boundaries] was not
such a serious problem because the ambiguity of patent claims was not so great").
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to use things and resources. Patentable inventions are also always novel and
unique. These widely unacknowledged differences between real property
and patentable ideas suggest that tangible property is not the proper baseline
for evaluating the certainty or uncertainty of patent boundaries.
II. CRITIQUE OF THE PATENTS-AS-PROPERTY ANALOGY
As suggested above, beyond the rather basic distinction between patent-
able ideas and real property based on tangibility, there are a number of even
more fundamental differences that throw into grave doubt any analogy be-
tween the two regimes. First, patentable ideas are not just intangible but also
conceptual in a way that necessarily focuses on utility and function. Patents
can therefore be seen as not just property-like rules of exclusion but also
regulation-like rules governing the use of resources. Patent claims are thus
not so much the easily demarcated boundaries of a tangible property res but
rather a much more complex and less easily defined set of prohibited uses.
Second, patentable ideas are, per design, always novel and unique in a
way that defies easy description through standardization or propertization.
These differences between patentable inventions and real property also sug-
gest an even more fundamental difference in the purposes of the patent
system compared to real property regimes. Any comparison between real
property and patentable property must therefore necessarily falter.
A. Uncertainty and the Conceptual Nature of the Patent Res
Patent claims operate on two different levels. On one level, they operate
as rules of exclusion. Patent claims set forth the boundaries of the patentee's
property, signaling the scope of the patentee's exclusive rights over her in-
ventive idea. On a second level, patent claims operate as complex rules of
governance, prohibiting specified uses of the functional characteristics of
objects in ways that would copy and therefore infringe the patentee's rights.
The dual nature of patent claiming has far-reaching implications for how
clearly patent claims can be delineated.
A patentable idea, sometimes called an inventive concept, is perhaps
most easily understood as a specific technological solution to some real
world problem that is new and non-obvious. 8 It can also be understood as
the operative technical concept that defines how an invention works or how
it achieves its desired result. 79 In NTP Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., for
78. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1193, 1195 (Ct. Cl. 1980) ("The
claims define the inventive concept that the patent embodies.").
79. Ronald Slusky, Inventions Are Concepts, 14 INTELL. PROP. TODAY 8, 8 (July 2007):
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1893.03(d) Unity of Invention [R-7] (8th
ed. Rev. 8, July 2010) (referring to an "inventive concept" as "a technical relationship" with
"technical features that define the contribution [that the] claimed invention, considered as a
whole, makes over the prior art").
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example, NTP's inventive concept was not a particular portable email device
or even a particular wireless email system. Instead, the Federal Circuit
summarized NTP's invention as the idea of "integrating existing electronic
mail systems with RF wireless communications networks" so that travelers
no longer had to plug their portable PCs into telephone jacks in order to
access their incoming email messages.so NTP's technological concept in-
cluded references to processors, gateway switches, interface switches, and
other physical components,8' but it was not these components or even a par-
ticular physical arrangement of them that NTP asserted as its "property."
Rather, NTP's patent rights covered the system defined by its use of these
electronic components to transfer incoming email messages over an RF
network.
Unlike real property, patentable "property" res are thus highly concep-
tual in a way that concentrates on the functional and otherwise abstract
characteristics of an invention. Although most technological ideas are ulti-
mately embodied in physical forms such as machines, chemicals,
mechanical devices, and physical processes, patent property rights do not
cover those particular tangible embodiments or their components.82 Indeed,
the physical embodiments of any invention or the specific components used
to make those embodiments are often the subject of entirely separate proper-
ty rights. 83 Rather, the res of a patent's property rights is the intangible
technological idea behind the invention.
The inventive concept behind an invention is a specific way of exploit-
ing the dynamic relationships among specific tangible structures that create
80. NTP, Inc., v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1288-89 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
As mentioned previously, NTP actually sued RIM for infringement of a number of NTP's
patents, but all the patents in the suit were divisionals originating from a single patent applica-
tion. Id. at 1293.
81. See, e.g., U.S. Pat. No. 5,436,960 claim 1. The additional detail about the compo-
nents of NTP's inventive concept also satisfies the Patent Act's requirement that patentees
describe their inventions with sufficient detail to enable others to make and use their inven-
tions. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2011).
82. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) ("The primary meaning of the word
'invention' in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor's conception rather than to a
physical embodiment of that idea."); Fromer, supra note 24, at 725-26. Some court decisions
have even taken pains to avoid requiring that an invention be "physical"-that is, involving
physical or chemical materials-at all. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); In
re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
83. Newman, supra note 12, at 105 ("Even though the patent claims describe a physical
object-or to be more precise, a class of physical objects having functions and characteristics
that fall within certain parameters-the right to exclude conferred by the patent does not per-
tain to any such actual corresponding object."). Similarly, the "first sale" or "patent
exhaustion" doctrine refers to the fact that the purchaser of a copy of anything made from a
patented idea or made according to a patented process is nonetheless the owner of that thing
and has rights to use, resell, or otherwise transfer that item unfettered by claims of patent
infringement. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252 (1942); Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917); see also Glen 0. Robinson,
Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1449, 1452-53 (2004).
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a new and useful result. 4 A patent thus claims an inventive idea not only as
the new res of the patent's property-like rights but also as an exclusive, new
way of using concrete components to create new utility.85 This makes sense
for a number of reasons.
First, and most importantly, the patent system exists to incentivize the
creation of new and useful inventions, not to maintain or exploit existing
property. 8 To accomplish this, the patent system quite logically concentrates
on how an invention operates." Indeed, accepted patent claiming practices
specifically allow almost exclusive focus on the conceptual and functional
attributes of an invention rather than ownership over its tangible embodi-
ments or parts.
For example, method-of-use patents allow patentees to protect new uses
of existing inventions, even if those inventions are subject to other types of
"property" rights.88 Under the Patent Act, "means-plus-function" claiming
goes even further by allowing patentees to define inventions by the functions
of their individual parts rather than the structures, materials, or even process
steps for performing these functions." A patentee may use the term "fas-
tening means" rather than listing every type of tape, staple, brad, nail, glue,
or other equivalent means.90 Other examples of similarly function-oriented
84. Thomas K. Landry, Constitutional Invention: A Patent Perspective, 25 RUTGERS L.
J. 67, 73-74 (1993); Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim 9
(Working Paper Series, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1769270. That is not to
say that an inventor never needs to specify what components might display the requisite func-
tional characteristics necessary for an invention to operate. I merely make the point that even
when inventors do specify particular physical components, it is not their physical presence
that they are attempting to patent but rather their use in the inventive concept. Cf Oka v.
Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that patentable concepts include both a
"directing conception" of the desired result and the means for achieving that result); In re
Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 270 n.2, (C.C.P.A. 1980) (Baldwin, J., dissenting) (making a similar
point).
85. Newman, supra note 12, at 68.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 167-178.
87. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952) (providing for patent protection of "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof').
88. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 348 F.3d 992, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (New-
man, J., dissenting from denial of motion for rehearing en banc); MPEP § 2173.05(q). In fact,
a method-of-use patent might employ an invention that is covered under a separately owned
composition-of-matter or manufacture patent. Id. Note also the distinction between patentable
"utility," or the purpose of an invention, and "function," or how the invention operates. In
method-of-use patents, the original invention still "functions" in the same way but now is
being used for a different "utility" or purpose.
89. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Intellectual Sci. & Tech., Inc. v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 589
F.3d 1179, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
90. Elements listed in a means-plus-function format are interpreted as covering the
structure, material, or steps the patentee listed as examples of the component in her specifica-
tion as well as any equivalents thereof. Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention,
Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93
GEO. L.J. 1947, 1975 (2005).
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claiming techniques are Markush claiming,9' product-by-process claiming,92
and terms of approximation such as "substantially" and "about."'
Second, modem patent claiming's emphasis on technological character-
istics over physical ownership comports with the needs of efficiency. There
may be many ways of executing or "practicing" an invention by substituting
one equivalent part or parts for others.94 In the means-plus-function claiming
example above, the function of "fastening" is more important to the in-
ventive concept at issue than the particular physical components used for
that function. Functional claiming allows the patentee to economize on
needlessly listing every single structure that would serve the purpose.9 5
These efficiencies also occur outside of means-plus-function claiming.
Whenever an inventive concept takes the form of multiple physical exam-
ples, or embodiments, defining the invention by its technological concept
rather than its various physical forms will save drafting costs. In NTP's case,
for example, the court found that multiple models of RIM's BlackBerry
handheld devices and the software used to operate them all infringed a
single system claim in one of NTP's patents. Although these infringing
models varied in size, shape, or additional functionality offered, they were
all still embodiments of the same operative concept described in NTP's
claim.96
If, however, NTP had been required to describe its invention not by its in-
ventive concept but by listing every possible embodiment that could ever be
made from that concept, the patent claim would have demanded volumes of
text and some degree of clairvoyance. The costs of drafting such a claim
would have been prohibitive, as would the costs of reading and understanding
91. Markush claiming allows a patentee to claim an invention by listing interchangea-
ble components rather than specifying each alternative structure or species of an invention. Id.
at 1975-76 (and sources cited therein); Louis S. Sorell, The Application of the Doctrine of
Equivalents to Chemical Inventions: A Primer, II ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 225, 238 & n.68
(2001).
92. Product-by-process claiming "enable[s] an applicant to claim an otherwise' patentable
product that resists definition by other than the process by which it is made." In re Thorpe, 777
F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoted in Irah H. Donner, Combating Obviousness Rejections
Under 35 U.S.C. Section 103,6 ALB. L. Se. & TECH. 159, 229 (1996)).
93. Meurer & Nard, supra note 90, at 1975-76 (and sources cited therein) (noting ac-
ceptable use in patent claims of terms of approximation such as "substantially" or "about,"
rather than more definite measurements).
94. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1780 ("The metes and bounds of a property
line define a single physical entity, but the peripherally construed claims of a patent are di-
rected to multiple theoretical entities."); see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 640
F.2d 1193, 1195 (Ct. Cl. 1980) ("The claims define the inventive concept that the patent em-
bodies. The specifications, on the other hand, are designed to reveal how the invention may be
put into practice.").
95. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
96. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (de-
scribing how BlackBerry 800, 900, and 5810 series handheld devices were all found to
infringe Claim 15 of NTP's '960 patent).
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the resulting patents. 97 Describing an invention by its conceptual and func-
tional characteristics, by contrast, is more direct and more efficient. One can
effectively explain the concept of "prime numbers" in less space than it
would take to write the infinitely long list of every concrete embodiment of
the prime number concept.
Finally, patent claiming's focus on inventive concepts serves an equita-
ble purpose. If NTP had been required to describe its invention by its
physical embodiments instead of its conceptual characteristics, the public
would not have known what NTP considered the essential part of its inven-
tions. Clever copyists could also have more easily designed around NTP's
patents by simply swapping out one or two unimportant physical character-
istics while still free riding on the inventor's idea. Defining its invention by
its conceptual characteristics allowed NTP to claim rights over its entire
idea, not just specific embodiments of it.
The conceptual nature of patent claims does tend to make them more
"abstract," though, which affects their clarity. Despite functional claiming
methods, technological concepts are difficult to describe in ways that fully
communicate their boundaries. Technological concepts, particularly novel
ones, inevitably strain the inherently limited capacity of language to define
them.98 For one thing, delineating concepts rather than physical structures
means that a patent claim drafter lacks the physical referents on which a
land surveyor or machinist might rely.99 For another, patent drafters must
grapple with the fact that the functionality and other non-spatial characteris-
tics of their inventive ideas add further dimensions that defy clear
description. The "abstract" nature of patent claiming thus stems to a great
extent from its conceptual rather than physical focus.'
Many commentators have noted that some technologies are inherently
more conceptual and therefore abstract and difficult to define than others.' 0'
For example, computer software and business method patents are often
thought to be defined more by concept than chemical compound patents.
The functional features of software depend less on specific physical compo-
nents, while the function of chemical inventions correlates much more
strongly to physical structure.102 In fact, patents on technologies such as
DNA sequences and proteins are often limited to only one or two structures
because those are the only structures known to correspond to the functional
97. General Elec. Co. v. United States, 206 U.S.P.Q. 260, 1979 WL 25152 (Ct. Cl.
Trial Div. 1979); Gillette Safety Razor Co. v. Clark Blade & Razor Co., 187 F. 149, 156
(C.C.D.N.J. 1911), affd, 194 F. 421 (3d Cir. 1912).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
99. See Smith, supra note 12, at 1799.
100. Cf In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir 2008); BESSEN & MEURER, supra note
10, at 199.
101. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 152-54, 162, 243-47.
102. Id. at 187-214, 244.
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characteristics claimed.'0 As a result these patents enjoy fewer of the effi-
ciencies of conceptual claiming because the relationship between structure
and function is not as well understood. Nonetheless, a patentee's rights to
such inventions still cover the inventive concept, not the structure. It is just
that the inventive concept is known to map onto only one or two structures,
making such inventions look as if they are more physical and less conceptu-
al than other types of patents.1"" Patent "property" rights over an inventive
concept are never limited to its physical embodiments, even if the concept is
so narrow as to be practicable only as a single embodiment.
By contrast, process patents, like computer software patents, are gener-
ally considered more abstract than those of machines, manufactures, or
compositions of matter because they correlate less strongly to particular
physical boundaries,' with business method patents lying at the far end of
that spectrum.'06 All the same, abstraction in patent claiming is not unique to
these areas for all patent claims focus on function and other conceptual
qualities, not on physical boundaries. 0 7
Moreover, any attempt to exclude less physically bound technologies as
too abstract would necessarily lead to debates over patentable subject mat-
ter, an issue itself fraught with uncertainty.' 08 Patentable subject matter
restrictions on business methods, software, biotechnology, and process
patents require careful balancing of costs and benefits. There are many rea-
sons beyond patent claim clarity to question whether business methods or
software qualify as patentable subject matter. Business methods and soft-
ware may not be "technological" enough because they are not applications
of laws or phenomena of nature but rather more human phenomena.'09 Simi-
larly, biotechnological inventions are often seen as potential phenomena of
nature or as lacking enablement."o Nonetheless, the courts and the United
States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") have resisted excluding entire
categories of inventive concepts because the net benefits from doing so are
103. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology, 43 Hous. L. REV.
561 passim (2006).
104. Cf id.
105. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 12, at 1796-97, 1799.
106. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); Newman, supra note 12, at 104-05. But see JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 13, at
145 (noting that patent scope overbreadth in business method and software patents also stems
in part from the vagueness of prior art and lack of PTO examiner expertise in those fields).
107. Cf Newman, supra note 12, at 105-06 (arguing that machine patents are just as
much rules of governance as business method patents).
108. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 244-45; Michael W. Carroll, One For All:
The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 845, 893
(2006).
109. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1009-10 ("[A] process is non-technological where
its inventive concept is the application of principles drawn not from the natural sciences but
from disciplines such as business, law, sociology, or psychology.").
l10. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 68.
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unclear."' For example, it is not clear that any gains in patent claim clarity
from excluding such inventions would outweigh any potential loss of incen-
tives to their inventors."l2 Excluding such inventions from patentable subject
matter could also upset established expectations."'
Regardless of our concerns about patentable subject matter, moreover,
patent claims are necessarily "abstract" because they are rules of governance
as well as rules of exclusion. Unlike a virtual, computer-generated version
of a tangible object, or even an intangible "object" such as data or numerical
values, patentable concepts are an entirely different form of property res.'14
Patent claims therefore are both use-oriented and exclusion-oriented.
To understand patent claims as use-oriented rules of governance, one
might more accurately analogize patents to a real property regime in which
owners could claim property rights over specific uses of real property. Such
a regime might, for example, grant ownership rights over a particular use of
soil on any and all real property plots. Imagine further that such ownership
rights define the particular use as modification of the soil to a pH, organic
matter content, and water content all within specified ranges, perhaps be-
cause this soil composition is conducive to cultivating a certain type of
bean." 5 The exact composition of the soil is unimportant, for the owner
could define his rights as extending over the entire range of acid, organic
matter, and water content that functions to grow beans. As long as the acidi-
ty and water and organic content of any soil were modified to within the
ranges specified, all would be "embodiments" of the invention.
Note the broad compass that such use rights would grant. The owner of
these use rights could assert them regardless of the location or ownership of
the soil. And although the owner of these rights originally claimed them
because of the soil's utility in growing beans, his rights would not be limited
to that utility. If the owner of a different plot of land were to modify her soil
for reasons entirely unrelated to bean cultivation-and even if she herself
111. Id. at 244-45; Michael W. Carroll, One fior All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 845, 893 (2006) ("The courts have resisted
using discretion to sustain categorical exclusions from patentable subject matter, finding this
to be too crude a filter.").
112. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 13, at 203-04 (noting the difficulties of empirically
evaluating the differential effects of the patent system on various technologies).
113. See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653
F.3d 1329, 1366-68 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., concurring). Congress has recently, however,
decided to exclude two categories of invention: those "directed to or encompassing a human
organism," Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, P.L. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011)
(limiting 35 U.S.C. § 101), and "any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability,"
id. § 33 (limiting 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 such that tax methods "shall be deemed insuffi-
cient to differentiate a claimed invention from the prior art").
114. Cf Moringiello, supra note 17, at 183-89 (noting the applicability of property law
to virtual versions of tangible property).
115. For reasons that will become clear in the next section, assume also that this particu-
lar range of soil composition does not occur naturally and that the owner of these use rights
was the first to discover it. See infra text accompanying notes 152-154.
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had method-of-use rights on some other use for the soil-the owner of the
soil composition rights could immediately sue her for trespass as long as her
modified soil fell within the owner's functionally defined rights."' Thus,
depending on how often people modified the soil on their plots to fall within
the specified parameters, a very large number of plots might lie within the
metes and bounds of the owner's property rights. If real property res were
truly analogous to patent res, we would have a very different real property
regime indeed!
This revised real property analogy also illustrates how the functional
and conceptual delineation of rights in patent claims is at least as much
about use as it is about exclusion. The scope of the owner's property rights
is defined solely by the functional characteristics of the soil. The owner
therefore has the right to exclude all others from using his concept of modi-
fying soil to fall within his specified range of composition. The inventor
would not necessarily have the right to use that modified soil himself if he
has no rights to possess the soil physically. Nonetheless, he would have the
right to prevent others from modifying their own soil. These soil owners
would simply have to recognize that their possessory rights were now sub-
ject to restrictions on their use.
In much the same way, patents can be seen as rules of governance con-
centrating on use, not on the physical possession of resources. Patent law
forbids anyone from making, using, selling, or offering to sell a patented
invention without the patentee's authorization. Unlike real property rights,
however, merely possessing or otherwise trespassing on any given physical
embodiment of that invention does not constitute infringement of the
patent."' Patent law's disregard for physical possession emphasizes its focus
on use. Because patent rights are directed to technological concepts rather
than physical "things," the claims defining patent rights do not highlight the
physical boundaries of those "things" so much as their permissible and im-
permissible uses." 8 Thus, although it is tempting to think of patents
primarily as property rights, they are also in large part rules of govern-
ance.119
Rules of governance differ from rules of exclusion in that they proscribe
the use of resources rather than the ownership or possession of those
resources. Patentable inventions and other types of intellectual property are
widely viewed as non-possessory and non-rivalrous, although this view has
come largely from the patents-as-property perspective. Because patentable
116. Again, the "utility" of an invention is distinct from its "function" as those terms are
used in this Article. See supra text accompanying note 89. In this example, the utility of the
modified soil is to grow better beans. The soil's function lies in how the modified pH, water
content, and organic matter content interact to make that utility possible.
I 17. Newman, supra note 12, at 105.
118. Cf Lemley, supra note 20, at 1042, 1072 & n.166 (noting that intellectual property
injuries can be characterized under tort rather than property).
119. Newman, supra note 12, at 68.
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ideas are intangible property, they can be used without being consumed and
without precluding simultaneous use by others. But really, to say that patent
property res are non-rivalrous is merely to advert to the fact that, as rules of
governance, patent claims proscribe uses, not physical possession.
Regardless of whether we view patentable inventions as property or as
rules of use, moreover, their non-possessory nature has a number of implica-
tions for the level of certainty they provide.'2 0 One well-recognized
implication is that patent property rights are more prone to innocent in-
fringement because they lack the automatic notice that comes with the
rivalrousness of physical possession.' 2' Functional and conceptual character-
istics, by contrast, are often difficult to observe and measure directly. Even
patentees themselves cannot easily detect when their inventions are being
made, used, or sold and therefore infringed. Many non-owners may be well
entrenched in infringing on a patent by the time that either they or the
patentee realize what is happening.122
Consider again the real property example above in which ownership is
claimed by functional characteristics such as soil composition. Under this
method of claiming rights to land, the claimed characteristics might affect
multiple plots of land outside the claimant's physical possession. The claim-
ant therefore might not even know about all of the various plots that fall
within his ownership rights. Indeed, the particular plots that fall within his
rights might change over time, as various plots gain or lose the characteris-
tics by which his rights are defined.123 The claimant himself might be the
cause for such changes because he might use up the organic or water content
of the soil. Although these resources themselves are consumable, however,
the fact that the claimant has defined his rights by functional characteristics
rather than by physical boundaries means that he could simply shift his
rights to other plots of land whose characteristics meet that definition. The
claimant would never be limited to a single plot or even single group of
plots, as the plots that fall under his ownership rights would be potentially
120. Note that here "possession" refers to dominion over a physical resource, such as the
physical embodiment of an invention. Under this definition, intellectual property res are non-
possessory goods. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44. When addressing the
validity of a patent, however, the PTO and the courts often use the term "possession" in a
different manner to refer intellectual dominion over an inventive concept, such as through
enablement, written description, or actual reduction to practice, as a way of proving comple-
tion of an invention. See, e.g.. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Guidelines for Examination of Patent
Applications Under 35 U.S.C. 112, T 1, "Written Description" Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg.
1099-01 (Jan. 5, 2001). These two types of "possession" are sometimes used interchangeably.
See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 64-68. The two types should be carefully
distinguished, however, especially when used in relation to the clarity and public-notice func-
tion of patent claims.
121. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 34, 248-49; LANDES & POSNER, supra
note 41, at 14.
122. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 41, at 15-16.
123. Cf BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 63-64 (noting the difficulties of defining
property rights over animals or other resources that may migrate).
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ever-changing. Under this alternative, patent-like system of defining real
property rights, mere physical possession of a particular plot of land by the
claimant therefore is irrelevant as a way of signaling ownership.
Finally, the revised analogy between patents and real property helps us
appreciate another seldom acknowledged phenomenon that distinguishes the
patent system from real property regimes: the inevitability of overlapping
rights and the effect of these overlapping rights on the clarity with which
those rights can be delimited. The conceptual and use-based nature of patent
rights leads to overlap in two ways.
First, patents create overlapping rights because, as explained above,
they are rules of governance that affect how others may use their own prop-
erty. Patent rights in an inventive idea will overlap with others' property
rights in the physical components and other resources that may be necessary
to implement the inventive idea. In the example above, a person who owns
use rights in soil modified to fall within his claimed range of acidity, water
content, and organic content may not be able to practice that use if he does
not own the soil himself. Similarly, the owner of the modified soil will not
be able to use the patentee's modifications because she does not own the
rights to modify her soil in this particular way. Both "owners" will have to
negotiate with one another to use their overlapping rights.
Second, patents create overlapping rights because separately patented
inventive ideas must often be combined in order to create a marketable
good. For example, while NTP owned a variety of patents on how to transfer
incoming emails wirelessly from wireline electronic mail systems, RIM
owned patent rights on how to make that transfer without the user having to
initiate it.124 Although RIM had been using its own patented technology in
its BlackBerry system, the suit by NTP demonstrated that RIM could not
continue to use that technology without simultaneously infringing NTP's
patents. Conversely, NTP, a non-practicing patent holder, could not have
used its patents rights in a system that trespassed on RIM's patent rights in a
non-user-initiated email transfer system. Both patented inventive ideas
achieved slightly different ends, but they covered overlapping technologies.
RIM and NTP are hardly unique in this situation. Mutually overlapping
patents are common and are often called "blocking" patents because they
effectively block each owner's use of its own patents without the consent of
the owner of the other overlapping patent. Depending upon the industry, the
conceptual res of two separate patents may overlap in complex and often
unpredictable ways.125 In the electronics industry, for example, many
124. U.S. Patent No. 6,219,694 (filed May 5, 1998); Press Release, RIM, Research In
Motion Files Wireless Patent Complaint Against Glenayre Electronics, Inc. (May 17, 2001),
available at http://press.rim.com/release.jsp?id=530.
125. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1588-90 (2003).
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separately patented but complementary technologies must be coordinated in
order to manufacture a single cell phone.12 6
The inevitably overlapping nature of patent rights is important because
it also creates uncertainty in patent claim boundaries. It is difficult to define
where one overlapping right stops and the other one starts, particularly
because the object of the rights is conceptual. Indeed, it is more accurate to
say that patent rights are not merely overlapping but in fact intermeshed.
Although a patent holder can simply decide not to use the part of his
inventive idea that overlaps with another patented idea, it is frequently the
case that the two overlapping patents are so interrelated that one or the other
patent holder is completely blocked from using his patented idea,'27 as was
the case for RIM.
This lack of an affirmative right to use one's own inventive concept oc-
curs because others' overlapping patent rights effectively act as negative
easements on one's own patent rights. 2 8 And lest we forget, patent rights
overlap not just with other patent rights but with tangible property rights as
well. As noted in the revised real property model above, patents create rules
of use that impose negative easements over the tangible resources used to
make or operate the protected inventive concept.129 Unsurprisingly, then,
overlapping rights are much more common in intellectual property than in
tangible property regimes.13 0
Unlike real property servitudes, though, the use restrictions created by
patents are not standardized or restricted in form nor must they be based on
any privity with the underlying property burdened with them."' To be sure,
overlapping property interests such as easements, overlapping estates, and
concurrent ownership occur in real property. Occasionally even real proper-
ty res themselves may overlap, as in the case of condominium rights.'32
Nevertheless, overlapping real property res are uncommon, and even over-
lapping real property interests are limited through the use of zoning, use
126. Id. at 1590-91.
127. E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 30.
128. See id. Some attribute the lack of an affirmative right to use one's own invention
to the non-rivalrousness of the patent res. See, e.g., id. at 6. This seems counterintuitive,
however, given that by definition, non-rivalrousness further lowers the likelihood of any
interference between two uses of the same resource. If we view patent claims not as bound-
ary definitions but as rules of use (and in particular as rules prohibiting certain uses),
however, the lack of an affirmative right to use one's own invention despite its non-
rivalrousness begins to make more sense.
129. Newman, supra note 12, at 105.
130. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 40-41, 53-54; see also Thomas W. Mer-
rill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle, I 10 YALE L.J. 1, 12-17 (2000) (noting that, although still extant, overlapping rights
in real property are at least limited and standardized).
131. Newman, supra note 12, at 106-07; see also infra notes 181-187.
132. Mixon & Otto, supra note 19, at 423; Mark D. West and Emily Michiko Morris,
The Tragedy of the Condominiums: Legal Responses to Collective Action Problems after the
Kobe Earthquake, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 903 passim (2003).
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restrictions, reversions, and other methods for minimizing non-possessory
and concurrent rights.'3 3 No such doctrines mitigate the inevitable overlap in
patent rights. Indeed, compared to real property, overlapping rights effec-
tively define patentable property.
B. Uncertainty and the Novelty and
Defeasibility of the Patent Res
Whether as rules of exclusion or rules of governance, patent claims are
subject to additional obstacles that limit their ability to provide ex ante clari-
ty. A significant but often overlooked source of uncertainty in setting patent
claim boundaries is the requirement that each and every patent property res
be novel.'" Unlike real property regimes, the patent system is not designed
to incentivize management of already existing property res. Rather, patents
are designed to incentivize the constant creation of new technological con-
cepts for eventual release into the public domain. The Patent Act demands
that every invention be a technological development that has never before
existed.' The res of a patent will therefore always be a unique entity that
has never been propertized.
The mandatory novelty of patent res thus creates additional obstacles to
clear boundary definition not seen in real property regimes. First, each res
must be evaluated for patentability through an information-intensive exami-
nation process, for unlike real property regimes, there is no presumption of
propertizability. Indeed, patentable inventions are propertizable only briefly
if at all. This reflects the different purposes of the patent system compared
to tangible property systems. Second, the necessarily unique nature of each
patentable res defies easy definition through standardization. Third, although
patentable inventions must be novel, they are also cumulative in nature, thus
increasing the likelihood of overlap.
Although patent practitioners and scholars usually use the term "novel-
ty" somewhat more specifically, inventive ideas must be novel in at least two
different respects in order to be patentable. Under the patentable subject
matter provisions of section 101 of the Patent Act, an inventive idea can
never be a naturally occurring or otherwise already extant phenomenon,
object, or even concept. Instead, a patentable concept must be "invented" ab
ovo and not merely "discovered."' 36 No one may patent naturally occurring
organisms, algorithms, or other laws of mathematics, biology, chemistry, or
physics, even if no one else had previously recognized them, for these are all
133. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 43-44 (noting how property claims to oil,
gas, and mineral rights can often overlap with competing claims to land rights).
134. See id. at 42.
135. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
136. Id. § 101; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (reiterating that
patent protection is not available for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas).
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merely "discoveries," not "inventions."'"3 Also, under § 102 of the Patent
Act, the invention must never have been known, invented, described, or used
by another. It is this latter type of novelty that most practitioners and
scholars discuss when they use the term "novelty."' All the same, a patent-
able invention must represent both a change from nature and a new advance
over technology already known.
The Patent Act thus requires that all patentable inventions be new and
therefore non-fungible. Although one patentable concept may serve as a
meaningful market substitute or even technological substitute for another
patentable concept, no patentable concept can ever be identical to another
known or naturally occurring concept. And although multiple inventors may
independently hit upon the same concept, only one-the first-may assert
patent property rights over it.139 Any and all other subsequent inventors will
have no rights over the concept. The best subsequent inventors can hope to
do, if they want to acquire patent property rights similar to those of the first
inventor, is to create similar and yet patentably different inventions them-
selves.
Tangible property res, by contrast, do not need to be novel. Real proper-
ty res typically have long been in existence, divided into parcels, and even
recorded as property by an entire series of previous owners by the time they
are the center of a dispute. If patents were truly analogous to real property
rights, any res of value, whether novel in any sense, would be propertizable,
but that is clearly not the case. 40 Rather, novelty is one of the sine qua non
of patentability. If we were to revise real property regimes to resemble
patent law more closely, on the other hand, the novelty requirement under
patent law would be akin to requiring that all real property rights holders be
like explorers who continually find new lands to claim as their own but then
turn those lands over to the public domain after twenty years. An even better
analogy would to be to require those same explorers to discover not only
new lands but also new forms of property rights, such as mining rights,
water rights, and airspace rights, as well as new methods of using them.
137. Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH.
L.J. 1, 2 (1992); Nard, supra note 14, at 776.
138. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). The recently enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
P.L. 112-29 § 3, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011), greatly revised the novelty provisions under sec-
tion 102 of the Patent Act as part of an overall shift from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file
system in measuring the date by which an invention must be "novel." Most of these changes
do not affect the analysis in this Article, however, as novelty will continue to be a fundamen-
tal basis for patentability.
139. Under the current Patent Act, the "first inventor" is the first actually to invent the
claimed invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, the
"first inventor" will switch for the most part to the first to file a patent application on the in-
vention.
140. See Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?,
68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 715, 718 (1993) (noting that if patents were truly treated as property,
mathematical algorithms and phenomena of nature would be patentable).
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As both rules of governance and as novel res, a constant stream of new
inventive ideas presents a property recording agency with challenges in de-
scribing the metes and bounds of such new property and in determining
whether it should be declared "property" at all. Given that inventions are
conceptual, one cannot simply look at them and determine whether they are
protectable. The requisite uniqueness of every patent property res means
that the res has to go through a vetting process before it can be recognized
(and protected) as "property."' 41 The additional steps of creation, vetting,
and recordation are thus additional factors that distinguish patentable prop-
erty from tangible property, which typically does not need to go through any
sort of vetting process. At most, tangible property may need to be surveyed
or appraised and recorded. Patentable property must go through a number of
more complicated steps.
The PTO has the duty to separate the patentable from the unpatentable
through a process called patent examination.142 The examination process
varies from patent to patent but averages about three and a half years of a
patent's total twenty-year term, in large part due to all of the inquiries that
must be made before a patent may be granted. As described above, patent
claims are thus designed not only to describe the inventive res of the patent
but also to help determine whether that res should be afforded any rights to
exclude others at all: that is, whether the invention claimed fulfills all the
criteria necessary to warrant the right of exclusivity.143
In addition to novelty, the other main criteria for patentability are that
the res be non-obvious, useful, and within the realm of patentable subject
matter.'" Patent property rights on inventions that do not meet these re-
quirements are believed to be unnecessary, socially wasteful, or both.'45 No
assumptions can be made based simply on similarity to previously
patentable concepts.146 Instead, patent examination is a multistep process
much more complex than merely measuring physical attributes and spatial
orientation. Because of its information-intensity, moreover, it is an ongoing
process in which even inventions granted patent protection may have that
protection taken away should invalidating information later emerge.
141. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 32, 53.
142. Id. at 32.
143. Cotropia, supra note 47, at 57.
144. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining patentable subject matter as "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof"); 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring that invention be nonobvious,
novel, and have utility); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (holding that
patent protection is not available for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas).
145. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112 (2006).
146. Cf Motingiello, supra note 17, at 182-83 (citing Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Property, Contract and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Di-
visibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 382-84 (2002)) (noting that novelty makes the
verification process difficult).
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Moreover, patent claim drafters must carefully differentiate their inven-
tions from all prior inventions ("prior art") to which they might be
technologically related. Such differentiation often involves subtle and com-
plex distinctions, particularly in densely populated fields of technology. Not
surprisingly, patent drafters rarely if ever write the perfect claim the first
time around. Usually there are multiple rounds of amendment to the patent's
claims in order to meet patentability requirements. This means that a
patent's claims continue to be uncertain in wording up until the final ver-
sions are drafted and granted by the PTO.147
For example, in NTP Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., RIM likely did
not even know of NTP's patents until NTP informed RIM and demanded
that RIM pay licensing fees. Although NTP filed for patent protection as
early as 1991, it took the PTO a number of years to examine and then grant
the patents at issue. 48 1In fact, the last of the patents that NTP asserted
against RIM at trial did not issue until 2001, after commencement of the
suit.149 Because the exact interpretation of a patent's claims is pivotal in re-
solving whether a defendant has infringed that patent, such delay in issuing
a patent creates a great deal of uncertainty for potential patent defendants.15 0
But if the PTO were to forgo its current in-depth examination practices in
order to prevent such delays in patent claim issuance, however, the PTO
could find itself granting patent applications that do not meet the require-
ments of patentability as well as denying applications that do.
Indeed, even with its rigorous examination procedures, the PTO's abil-
ity to distinguish the patentable from the unpatentable is less than perfect,
which frequently leads courts to invalidate improvidently granted patents.' 5 '
Although the PTO is charged with the initial responsibility for examining
patent applications, any patent or any claim within a patent describing an
invention that fails to meet the patentability requirements will be denied
147. But see BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 53 (attributing delays in finalizing
patent claims to continuations and other strategic efforts by patent applicants to "submarine"
others in the field).
148. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1288-89 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(explaining that the original patent application was subsequently divided into multiple appli-
cations, some of which were not issued until almost ten years later).
149. U.S. Patent No. 6,317,592 (filed Dec. 6, 1999) (issued Nov. 13, 2001); see also
NTP, Inc., 418 F.3d at 1287-89. All five relevant patents were granted on "continuations" of
the original patent application filed in 1991, meaning that the inventions protected under each
were originally disclosed in the 1991 application and are considered to have been filed dejure
at the same time as the 1991 application. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006). Although United States
patent law does not allow patent holders to sue for infringement until a patent issues, once the
patent is granted, patent holders may sue for enjoinder of any future infringement and even for
reasonable royalties covering both the period after the patent application was published, 35
U.S.C. § 122(b) (2006), and the period the defendant actually had notice of the application, 35
U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (2006).
150. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 62-63, 160.
151. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 13, passim.
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protection by courts, even if the patent was vetted by the PTO.15 2 In fact,
patent rights are never definitively "valid," although issued patents do at
least enjoy a presumption of validity rebuttable by clear and convincing evi-
dence.' Any court asked to enforce a patent may therefore declare any or
all of a patent's claims invalid if it decides that the claim should never have
been granted. The risk of such invalidations creates additional uncertainty
problems, as neither patent holders nor potential infringers can be certain
whether a patent's claim boundaries are valid, much less where exactly they
lie.
Disagreements over validity arise in two situations. A court may disa-
gree with the PTO's determination that a patent's claims meet the various
patentability requirements. Patent claim interpretation is a question of law,
so a court later asked to enforce a patent's claims may decide to interpret
those claims in a slightly different way such that they no longer meet
patentability requirements.154 In this situation, the court's interpretation su-
persedes any interpretation by the PTO, and the "reinterpreted" claims
therefore become invalid. As critics point out, clarity as to the claims' mean-
ing would obviously prevent these sorts of invalidations. 55 All parties
involved, including the PTO and the courts, would likely interpret clear
claims the same way.
But even if a claim's meaning seems perfectly clear, a potential infring-
er may still discover previously unknown references to relevant prior art
showing that the invention at issue does not in fact meet the patentability
requirements. In this second situation, a court would be obliged to invalidate
the affected claim, but uncertainty as to the claim's validity could not have
been prevented simply by a more clearly written claim. It is this latter
source of uncertainty that ultimately cost RIM in its defense against NTP's
patent infringement suit. RIM initially refused to settle the case, as it firmly
believed that all the patents NTP was trying to enforce were invalid for a
variety of reasons, including obviousness and lack of novelty over the prior
art. RIM even presented several pieces of previously unknown evidence in
support of 'its argument. The trial court rejected this evidence and refused
to find the patents invalid.156 RIM also asked the PTO to reexamine NTP's
152. Patent rights have often been described as "contingent property rights" or "proba-
bilistic property rights." Kesan & Banik, supra note 53, at 25; see also Mark A. Lemley &
Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. EcON. PERSPECTiVEs 75 (2005).
153. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
154. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
affd 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (establishing patent claim interpretation as a question of law).
155. See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 177, 179-80 (2005) ("The Office should strive, in
framing its content and format requirements, to produce a patent the claims of which a person
having ordinary skill in the art can understand without the need for routine court interven-
tion.").
156. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., No. 3:01CV767, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14338, at *6-14 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2003).
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patents, however, which the PTO did, finding the vast majority of all five
patents at issue in the case to be invalid.' Such disagreements between the
PTO and the courts are common.
While the potential invalidity of a patent's claims does not necessarily
detract from the importance of clarity, it does begin to highlight yet another
major difference between real property regimes and the patent system. First,
drafting claims of clear and predictable scope becomes much more difficult
when they might apply to unknowable future events such as the discovery of
invalidating prior art. Discovering all relevant prior art at the time of draft-
ing is a prohibitively expensive, time-consuming prospect and something of
an infinity-minus-one proposition.' Unlike real property systems,'5 9 fur-
thermore, the law provides no means other than the presumption of validity
to protect against unknown, unrecorded blemishes on patent rights, such as
invalidating prior art references.
Second, even those inventions that do meet the various patentability re-
quirements become invalid, in a sense, when their relatively short patent
terms expire. Again, patents last only twenty years from the date of filing the
patent application. After the patent expires, the exclusive res of the patent
becomes public domain. This stems in part from the goals of the patent sys-
tem to incentivize the eventual dedication of new technologies to the public
and to expand the wealth of public scientific and technological
knowledge. 60 By both incentivizing technological advances and the inevita-
ble release of rights to those advances, patents lay the foundation for future
advances.' 6' Under what is often referred to as the "patent bargain,"
157. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Va. 2005); see also
Scott A. McKeown, NTP's Last Stand: The Remnants of Patent Reexamination, PATS.
POST-GRANT (July 12, 2010), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/lang/en/20I0/07/new-ntp-patent-
suit-relies-on-non-existent-claims (and proceedings cited therein). See generally 35 U.S.C.
§§ 311-318 (2006) (allowing inter partes patent reexaminations before the USPTO). On
appeal, the Federal Circuit subsequently affirmed the PTO's reexamination decision as to the
invalidity of one of those patents, In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and
remanded for further reexamination as to the other four, In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
158. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 13, at 21.
159. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 73, at 559.
160. As suggested above, the claims are not the only part of a patent that provide a de-
tailed description of the invention protected therein. The "specification" of the patent includes
text, diagrams, and other relevant information that describes the patented invention "in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it per-
tains ... to make and use the same." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). Both the specification and the
claims are published eighteen months after the patentee files the application and remain part
of the public record after the patent is granted. Id. §§ 111-13, 154(a) (4); 37 C.F.R. 1.11, 1.14
(1997). See generally Cotropia, supra note 47.
161. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 1, 45-47 (2001); see also Suzanne Scotchmer. Standing on the Shoulders of
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVEs 29 (1991) (noting
the challenges of designing a system that rewards innovators while still fostering future inno-
vation).
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patentees offer up the resulting information to the public in exchange for a
limited period of exclusive rights over their inventions. 16 2 The alternative
would be for innovators to keep their technological breakthroughs secret,
depriving the public of the eventual dedication of those inventions to the
public domain and the information value of their patent disclosures.', The
result would be wasted investments in reinventing the wheel and rediscover-
ing old technologies.
Real property rights, by contrast, are potentially perpetual, and rights in
chattel last as long as the chattel itself." And although real property rights
may change, they never just disappear. Real property is always owned by
someone, even if it is just the government. By comparison, however, if
patents can be said to grant "property" rights, those rights are at best
defeasible.' 65 In this way patents differ markedly from real property. Even
full-term patent rights are at best analogized to an "estate" in land: inevita-
bly defeasible, limited in duration, and intangible in its boundaries.'66
Indeed, the structure of the patent system points to the futility of com-
paring tangible property boundaries with patent claim boundaries. Unlike
real property, patent property is not intended to exist forever. Often, it is not
intended to exist at all. Patent rights differ from tangible property rights in
that they are sometimes defeasible through invalidation even before patent
expiration, and their extremely short terms mean that they are almost imme-
diately defeasible by design.167
The deliberate defeasibility of patent "property" rights comports well
with the purpose of the patent system as opposed to that of tangible property
systems. Tangible property regimes generally operate on the principle that the
tangible res are consumable commodities that are subject to both the risk of
congestion externalities and the tragedy of the commons; tangible properties
and any investments in them quickly become depleted if no one has exclusive
rights to them. The law grants such exclusivity in the form of property rights
in order to limit the number of people who can use the commodity as well
as to incentivize investments in maintaining it.168
162. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1037 (1989).
163. Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L.
REV. 305, 308-09 (1992).
164. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 32.
165. Id. at 2; Kesan & Banik, supra note 53, at 25.
166. Mossoff, supra note 20, at text accompanying n.7-9.
167. See Kesan & Banik, supra note 53, at 25. The term "defeasible" is typically used in
property law to refer to a property interest, but not necessarily a property res, that may cease
to exist upon the occurrence of some future event. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 73, at 206-
07. Here, the term is being used to refer to the cessation of both the property res and any
interests in it.
168. The term "congestion externalities" refers to the idea that when a resource is limited
and no one has exclusive rights to its use, no one will have the incentive to optimize current and
future consumption of it. Instead, everyone will rush to use as much of the resource as they can
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As explained above, however, inventive concepts are non-rivalrous.
Multiple people may use an inventive concept without exhausting the re-
source or otherwise interfering with its use by others.'6 9 The patent system is
therefore not designed to promote allocative efficiencies by avoiding such
use conflicts as congestion externalities or depletion of resources.o Rather,
the patent system is built to incentivize the creation and public release of
technological information."'
To the extent that use of the information arising from a patent is limited
at all, it is limited for only a short duration and only as to the specific inven-
tion claimed under the patent. All other use of that information is freely
available to the public. Once a technological advance has been invented and
put to public use and all the information gained from it is released to the
public, there is often no reason to continue to protect the invention under
property rights beyond the minimum amount necessary to recoup costs and
to incentivize further investment.'72 Many scholars therefore view intellectu-
al property rights such as patents not as "property" at all but rather as
government subsidies.17 3 The relatively immediate defeasibility of patent
rights, compared to the potentially infinite duration of tangible property
rights, reflects not only the different cost structure of propertizing
information versus propertizing land or other tangible goods but also the
different reasons for doing so.1 74
before others can use it up, leading to rapid depletion of the resource. Similarly, the term "trage-
dy of the commons" refers to the lack of incentive not only to regulate use but also to invest in
the resource because of the lack of exclusive rights to the returns on that investment. LANDES
& POSNER, supra note 41, at 222-28; Dennis S. Karjala, Congestion Externalities and Extend-
ed Copyright Protection, 94 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1066-67 (2006).
169. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 41, at 226; Smith, supra note 12, at 1758. Although
trademarks, and perhaps even copyrighted works, may be subject to congestion externalities in
terms of "premature saturation of the market, consumer confusion, . . . and impaired demand
for the original work because of the poor quality of some of the unauthorized derivative
works," patented concepts generally are not thought to suffer any such risks. LANDES & POS-
NER, supra note 41, at 226; see, e.g., Karjala, supra note 168, at 1081 n.43.
170. Smith, supra note 12, at 1744.
171. Id.; Burk & Lemley, supra note 125, at 1605. Of course, earlier in history, the po-
tential for real property rights, particularly in areas that had not yet been settled or even
explored, could also be characterized as incentives to discover property. Similarly, the poten-
tial for property rights in buildings or in personal chattels can be seen as incentives to create
either of those as property res.
172. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 41, at 21-24. See generally Lemley, supra note
20 (arguing that innovators do not need to capture the full social value of their inventions).
Actually, returns on investments should slightly exceed costs in order to incentivize invention
and its commercialization over alternative investments. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 41,
at 21-24.
173. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 20, at 1031; see also Smith, supra note 12, at 1744-
45, 1784-85, 1793, 1796-97, 1800.
174. Cf Carter, supra note 140, at 718 (noting no reason why, if patents are truly proper-
ty, they should not last forever).
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The inevitable defeasibility of patent rights, whether through invalidity
or through patent-term expiration, is also a reflection of a larger notion that
knowledge, even in the form of an inventive concept, is not something that
should be privately owned.'7 1 Many scholars argue that the most important
function of the patent system is not so much the short-term, individual prop-
erty-like rights it grants but the overall expansion of technological
knowledge it ultimately releases into the public domain.' 6 Indeed, many
inventors simply choose not to patent their inventions and instead offer them
freely to the public.' 7 The patent system thus provides only temporary ex-
clusivity over an inventive concept rather than lasting property rights. The
resulting norm is not that ideas are property but that ideas are not property,
particularly if they have been around for some period of time.178
Beyond the costs of the vetting process, the requirement that each and
every patentable invention must be novel and unique creates recordation and
search costs as well. The novelty requirement makes it difficult to describe
new patents in ways that are not only easily recognized but also categorized
and catalogued in a searchable manner. In particular, the requisite unique-
ness of patentable ideas precludes standardization of the way we describe
those ideas and how we compare them to one another, especially given the
wide range of sciences and technologies swept under the single one-size-
fits-all patent banner.179 We can therefore never neatly pigeonhole patentable
concepts into a discrete numerus clausus type of system such as that seen in
real property systems.'s
The numerus clausus principle refers to closure of the set of property
forms that the law will permit as enforceable. In real property, for example,
the law has traditionally permitted the fee simple, the life estate, the lease,
and a limited number of other interests. The virtue of limiting cognizable
property interests to a few standardized forms is that it lowers the infor-
mation costs of evaluating them, particularly when the interests relate to
property that is intangible or otherwise problematic to observe or measure.
Such information costs may be particularly steep for third parties unfamiliar
with either the holder of a property interest or the res of that interest. Stand-
ardization through a numerus clausus approach thus creates efficiencies in
175. Id. at 717; Long, supra note 24, at 540.
176. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspec-
tives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 810 (1988).
177. For example, many inventors choose to achieve exclusivity over their inventions
through trade secrecy law, while others share their inventions with the public by publishing
descriptions of the inventions or otherwise dedicating their inventions to the public domain.
See Grady & Alexander, supra note 163, at 308-09.
178. Carter, supra note 140, at 717; Long, supra note 24, at 540.
179. Burk & Lemley, supra note 125, at 1588.
180. Newman, supra note 12, at 106-07.
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addressing in rem rights by reducing the dimensions of a property interest
that must be measured.' 8'
Applying the numerus clausus principle to patent claims would seem on
its face like the perfect idea. Intangible and highly conceptual patentable
ideas are particularly onerous for third parties to identify and measure, and
yet are fully enforceable against those third parties.8 2 Standardizing the
forms that those ideas can take would lower those third parties' information
costs.
And indeed, patent law does employ something of a numerus clausus
approach by limiting patentable ideas to those for a "process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter," although those categories have been
broadly interpreted.' Other than these loose categories, though, any type of
numerus clausus treatment would be impossible to apply in describing each
unique patentable inventive idea. Patentable ideas do not occur in neatly pre-
existing, standardized forms; otherwise, they would be unpatentable for lack
of novelty.' 84
As a result, neither those who draft patent claims nor those who inter-
pret them can simply rely on references to existing technological concepts
when trying to identify the novel aspects of the claimed invention. Technol-
ogy advances apace, and what might serve as a relevant referent for
describing today's new technology will be obsolete and irrelevant five years
from now. Simply relying on established glossaries, treatises, or other stand-
ardizations of technical terminology prove unhelpful when that terminology
is used to describe technologies that are constantly evolving.' Even the
inventors themselves, with intimate knowledge of their inventions and the
technological fields from which they come, have difficulty drafting patent
claims due to the constant novelty of res.
In fact, the more novel an invention, the more abstract the patent claims
on it are likely to be. An especially novel invention may fall completely out-
side of what is already known, with few recognizable reference points to
describe it or to cabin its patent scope. The more pioneering the invention,
181. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 CoL-
uM. L. REV. 773, 776-77 (2001); Merrill & Smith, supra note 130, at 3, 34; Francesco Parisi,
Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. Comp. L. 595, 625 (2002).
182. Newman, supra note 12, at 107.
183. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
184. Smith, supra note 12, at 1755 ("'Invention space' and original expressions do not
come pre-carved into things.").
185. Burk & Lemley, supra note 5, at 52 (suggesting that "the whole search for a 'plain'
or 'ordinary' or 'settled' meaning of patent claims is doomed to failure"). Contra BESSEN &
MEURER, supra note 10, at 239-40. Indeed, such difficulties may underlie some of the Federal
Circuit's reluctance to rely too heavily on technical dictionaries or treatises in interpreting
patent claims. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319-25 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc); see also infra text accompanying notes 235-237.
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the less likely it is to overlap with existing technology in the prior art.'' A
patentee may therefore claim her pioneering concept more broadly in un-
charted waters. Such greater patent breadth is generally considered
acceptable in those circumstances, as truly pioneering inventions are exactly
the kinds of technological developments we most want to incentivize
through the patent system. They represent huge advances in the useful arts
and set the foundation for a wide variety of further development.' To the
extent that we believe that patent scope should reflect the social welfare the
underlying invention creates, pioneering patents should be broad.
Given that both novelty and breadth lead to abstractness in claiming,
however, patent claims on pioneering inventions will inevitably be among
the most abstract.'8 8 Pioneering biotechnology patents, for instance, are of-
ten characterized as "upstream research" because they set the ground for,
and thus overlap with, any number of later developments. As these later de-
velopments based on the upstream biotech inventions evolve, they inevitably
change the field as well as the meaning of the terms used in the field. This
leads to what many see as changing claim meaning over time.' 89 This kind
of evolution and change is unavoidable, however, as all technology must
build upon what came before it' 90 and future technological advances are dif-
ficult to predict.191 Simply disallowing the patenting of certain types of
technologically abstract or pioneering inventions because of their tendency
to evolve at a more or less rapid pace would eliminate vast swaths of new
science and technology from the patent system.192
In addition, the patent system's requirement for novel patent res exacer-
bates the overlapping rights problem created by the uniquely conceptual
nature of the patent res. Inventive concepts are cumulative by nature. It is
often said that technology progresses by "standing on the shoulders of
giants,"'9 and the cumulative nature of technological progress is clearly a
foundational element of the patent system. Any rights in that technology
will therefore tend to overlap, further exacerbating difficulties in delineating
186. Cf BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 64-68 (noting a similar effect with regard
to basic biotechnology research patents).
187. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-
Generation Products Be Patentable?, 27 RAND J. EcoN. 322 (1996) (exploring the proper
balance of returns between pioneering and follow-on inventors); see also Joshua Sarnoff,
Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 157, 1205 (2004) (and sources cited therein).
188. See generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 125 (and sources cited therein).
189. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 64-68 (attributing the emergence of
"upstream" biotech patents to patenting on federally funded academic research under the
Bayh-Dole Act).
190. See infra text accompanying notes 241-243.
191. See supra text accompanying note 186; infra text accompanying notes 230-245.
192. Contra BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 27.
193. Scotchmer, supra note 161, at 29.
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where one set of rights ends and the next begins.194 This is in many ways the
diametric opposite of the overlap problem faced by pioneering inventions.
Whereas pioneering inventions are unlikely to overlap with either prior or
current inventions in their fields, the cumulative nature of technology means
that subsequent inventors are likely to overlap with others' efforts in the
same area and therefore run afoul of their rights.
In fact, the cumulative nature of technological progress makes some de-
gree of overlap inevitable. Even inventors completely independent of one
another must all build upon the same prior art in their field. This commonality
will therefore tend to channel their research efforts in the same directions,
often toward similar ideas. The conceptual and non-possessory nature of tech-
nological ideas, however, means that those multiple independent inventors
may be completely unaware of the parallel efforts of their peers.' The odds
of those independent inventors developing identical or at least substantively
overlapping inventive concepts is therefore quite high.
Indeed, most alleged patent infringers appear to be inventors acting in
good faith to develop their own original ideas, rather than copyists or free
riders.'96 For example, the RIM and NTP backstory explains in part why
RIM was caught so unaware of its infringement of NTP's patents. Software
developers for both NTP and RIM independently invented the same tech-
nology at about the same time, NTP first in the late 1980s to early 1990s,
and RIM second in the 1990s.'97 Others, such as ALOHANet, were also
working on this technology around the same time, raising real issues about
the novelty and non-obviousness of NTP's patented ideas.'98
Such "patent races" are common between inventors competing, whether
knowingly or not, to be first to claim rights to the same or very similar in-
ventive ideas. Inventors who are second in time are sometimes completely
excluded from using their own inventions, either because their inventive
ideas are identical to the first inventor's invention or because the second in-
ventor's idea at least overlapped with the first inventor's idea.' 99 Even if
patent claims were drafted in perfectly clear language, inventors would inev-
194. Blair & Cotter, supra note 161, at 45-47; Scotchmer, supra note 161, passim.
195. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 48-49.
196. Id. at 124. Some therefore advocate that such "innocent" infringers be allowed prior
user rights or some other means of lessening liability under patent law's strict liability regime.
See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10. at 249-52. The recently enacted Leahy-Smith
Act may provide exactly such protections. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, P.L. 112-29, § 5,
125 Stat. 284-341 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 273 to grant prior-user defenses to any third
party commercially using any invention in good faith more than one year prior to filing or
disclosure by the filing inventor).
197. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 2d 751, 755 (E.D. Va. 2003);
see also McKenna et al., supra note I: Stoughton, supra note 2.
198. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., No. 3:01CV767, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14338, at *6-14 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2003).
199. Cf BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 44 (describing similar problems in mining
rights). See generally Scotchmer, supra note 161, at 30; Scotchmer, supra note 187, at 323.
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itably overlap with one another in their inventive efforts. Other than the gold
mine rush or Oklahoma land rush, 200 races for ownership are uncommon in
real property regimes, marking yet another significant difference between
patents and real property.
To summarize, patents resemble real property rights only superficially.
Patents certainly grant inventors exclusive in rem rights over their inventive
ideas, and these rights are fairly robust. Beneath that property-like surface,
however, patent claims are also rules of use that frequently create negative
easements on others' property. Patent claims as rules are therefore more
prone to uncertainty than real property deeds, not only because they repre-
sent intangible rules of use but also because they are novel and unique, in
keeping with their purpose to incentivize the creation and almost immediate
release of inventive ideas into the public domain.
The next Part analyzes patent claims as rules of governance, examining
in detail whether patent claims as rules can ever be expected to achieve cer-
tainty and clarity. The Part concludes that, for a number of reasons, patent
claims cannot achieve such certainty and are better interpreted as more like
standards than bright-line rules.
Il. THE NEW VIEW: UNCERTAINTY AND PATENT CLAIMS
As RULES OF GOVERNANCE
For all the reasons discussed above, patent claims are not just bounda-
ries marking exclusive rights to inventive and novel ideas but also specific
rules governing the use of resources to create utility. Rules cannot provide
much certainty when the future to which they apply is itself uncertain. This
is particularly true when viewing patent claims as rules of governance,
moreover, for rules of governance offer even less clarity and depend even
more upon ex post interpretation than rules of exclusion. This Part therefore
takes the analysis further and reorients it slightly by conceptualizing patent
claiming as rules rather than as standards and examining how that reorienta-
tion affects the certainty of patent claim meaning.
Unlike real property boundaries, patent claims are not lines on a plat
map or references to landmarks. Claims are written prescriptions, and like
all written law, they can be couched as either rules or standards. The follow-
ing analysis of patent claims as rules rather than standards thus benefits
200. The Homestead Act of 1862 allowed settlers to claim up to 160 acres, frequently
leading to multiple settlers attempting to claim the same or overlapping plots of land. Only
forty percent succeeded in obtaining title, with fraud and abuse of the claim resolution pro-
cess. Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 1862 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976); John Vaterlaus, Stuck
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The United States Supreme Court Misapplies Statutory
Construction Precedent in Bedroc Ltd. v. United States, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1263, 1263
(2005); see also M. Brent Leonhard, There Are No Implied Easements over Trust Lands, 33
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 457, 482-85 (2008) (describing some of the overlap created by the
Homestead Act).
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from the rich literature comparing rules and standards, particularly in terms
of the certainty that each provides. Viewing patent claims through the rules-
versus-standards lens helps explain why, despite patent claims' careful
framing as rules, patent claims still face uncertainty in anticipating all the
contexts to which they might apply. As such, we cannot expect patent claims
to offer complete certainty ex ante but must accept that they must often be
interpreted in light of their context ex post.
Rules and standards differ as to their flexibility and specificity as well
as their relative time frames. The choice between rules and standards centers
on whether to convey the law with specificity ex ante, before parties choose
whether and how to act, or to provide only more general guidance, leaving
the courts to decide ex post how to apply that guidance in each case.20 1 A
rule provides the specifics of the law ahead of time, often leaving only is-
sues of fact for determination ex post. A standard, by contrast, ex ante
provides only the rough contours of the law, leaving for later not only factu-
al determinations but also determination of what exactly the law should be
in the circumstances at hand. 202
For example, a rule might specify ex ante that driving faster than sixty-
five miles per hour on a highway is illegal. The only determination remaining
would be whether a driver was going faster than sixty-five miles per hour and
was doing so on a "highway." A standard, by contrast, might specify only that
driving "in an unsafe manner" is illegal, leaving for later whether a given
driver was in fact traveling at unsafe speeds as well as what range of speeds
might be "unsafe" on that particular road at that particular time under those
particular weather conditions.2 03
Patent claims clearly display many of the characteristics of rules partic-
ularly in their function as rules of exclusion.20 Patent claims establish
relatively clear, nearly absolute rights of exclusivity over the inventive ideas
they protect. A patentee has the right to prevent others from making, using,
selling, or offering to sell her invention regardless of identity or intent and
regardless of whether the patentee is even harmed. Moreover, unlike copy-
right, patent rights are protected under a property rule and unfettered by
possible compulsory licenses, experimental or fair use rights, or other equi-
table incursions. Treating patent claims as rules of exclusion relieves
potential infringers of the need to collect and evaluate the information that
201. Kaplow, supra note 76, at 568-87.
202. Id.
203. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1778-79; see also Louis Kaplow, The Value of
Accuracy in Adjudication, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 309 (1994); Kaplow, supra note 76, at 559.
204. See generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1777-83 (noting the similarities
between rules and the peripheral claiming system); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure
of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141. 1142-43 (2008)
(characterizing the modem patent system as preferring rules over standards).
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would otherwise be necessary to make these kinds of distinctions. 205 As long
as the boundaries of the property res are clear, and as long as everyone
knows on which side of those boundaries they stand, the information costs
for all parties concerned should be minimal. 206
And indeed, the ideal function of patent claims, as described above, is
to give public notice of the boundaries of a patent holder's property-like
rights to exclude all others by "particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 207
Claims that meet this requirement will ex ante inform the public and, if nec-
essary, the courts of the boundaries of the claimed right to exclude others. 208
Some factual determinations will remain to be made ex post, as is true of the
application of any rule. In patent law, the question of whether an allegedly
infringing device does in fact infringe a given patent claim is considered to
be a factual issue. In most cases, however, infringement is uncontested after
the relevant patent claims have been construed by the court.
Belief in the virtues of specifying patent scope in this way prompted the
adoption of the peripheral claiming system.2' This modem system of patent
claiming dates back at least to the Patent Act of 1870, when the peripheral
claiming system was first codified. Before that time, patent law subscribed
to the central claiming system, under which patents contained only back-
ground information and written and pictorial descriptions of the patented
invention but no specific boundary-defining claims. The courts were left to
determine the scope of a patentee's rights and any possible infringement
thereof by discerning the "principle" or "essence" of the invention as de-
scribed in the patent, as if measuring patent scope by a standard. 210
Because of the inherent difficulties of defining the patentee's rights
from the scattering of information contained in the specification, Congress
changed the law to require claims specifically to "mark out the periphery or
boundary of the area covered by the [patent]." 211 Patents must now include
one or more claims in rule-like form so that they provide a detailed descrip-
tion of what the patentee considers her exclusive inventive idea. Great detail
205. Smith, supra note 12, at 1746-48. But see Newman, supra note 12, at 63 (noting
that after the Supreme Court's decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, injunctive relief
is not as guaranteed as it used to be).
206. Smith, supra note 12, at 1728.
207. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). On patent claims as rules generally, see Burk & Lemley,
supra note 7, at 1778-83; Fromer, supra note 24, at 757-60.
208. Nard, supra note 14, 788-96.
209. See generally Cotropia, supra note 47, at 64-65 ("The claim finds its roots in the
need for an instrument to notify the public about the patent's scope of protection."); Fromer,
supra note 24, at 731-35 (describing the development of the peripheral claiming system).
210. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1772.
211. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Nies, J., dissenting) (quoting RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS § 6 (1949)). See gener-
ally Cotropia, supra note 47, at 56-59 (explaining the scope-defining function of patent
claims).
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in patent claiming is believed to foster consistency and ease of interpretation
by making claims more precise and saving others from having to risk
interpretive errors in applying them. 212 Patent applicants are therefore ex-
pected to invest heavily in crafting their patent claims with as much detail as
feasible.
The evolution from the central to peripheral claiming system is slightly
more complex than described here, but for the most part, the rule-like claim
is considered the sole determinant of patent scope.2 13 By doing away with
central claiming, the patent system intentionally gave up almost all flexibil-
ity in determining patent boundaries ex post under a more standard-like
approach.
Patent claims are also rule-like in that they shift the burden of specify-
ing legal liability ex ante onto their drafters, the patentees. Because rules
and standards differ in the certainty they offer, they also differ in their rela-
tive cost structures and where they place the burden of those costs. Greater
certainty involves greater ex ante costs, including the costs of crafting laws
that are predictable yet precise.214 By specifying the law in detail up front,
rules offer more certainty and are therefore more useful when certainty in
the law is important, such as when actors want to know what to expect of
the law in order to allocate their investments accordingly. This may be par-
ticularly true when liability for violations is strict,2 15 as is the case with
patent infringement.216 Rules are also more costly to draft because they shift
onto the drafter the burden of anticipating and addressing all the possible
contexts in which they might be applied.
Standards, by contrast, are less costly to draft but more costly to apply
because they leave such determinations for resolution ex post. Standards are
thus more effective in giving content to the law in a more context-dependent
and often equitable manner. But they also lead to more discretionary out-
comes that are difficult for parties to predict with certainty.217
In the end, these differences in cost allocation equate to a choice in bur-
den shifting between the drafters of the law, the courts who interpret the law,
212. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); see also John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return
of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 S. CT. REv. 273, 308 (describing the central
claiming system as too amorphous for juries).
213. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1745; Golden, supra note 14, at 348-62. While
courts are required to interpret claims according to the specification of the patent, the specifi-
cation is to be used only as an interpretive aid, not to substantively determine the boundaries
of the patent. Golden, supra note 14, at 348-62.
214. Kaplow, supra note 203, at 308.
215. See Long, supra note 24, at 469.
216. Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Con-
struction, 59 FLA. L. REv. 333, 366 (2007) ("Concern with certainty is ubiquitous in legal
rule-making. It is perhaps the most highly sought-after quality of claim construction."); see
Sobel, supra note 35. at 6.
217. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1779; see also Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus
Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 49, 52-55 (2007).
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and the public who is subject to the law. Rules place the initial information
burden on the drafting parties, potentially easing the burden on courts and
the public. Standards shift the burden from the drafting parties to the
courts in terms of ex post resolution of the law and to the public in terms
of potential confusion about the law.218 The appropriate locus of the bur-
den ultimately depends on who is more efficiently able to bear it.
Switching back to patent claims, then, it makes sense that patentees
should have to specify the boundaries of their patents ex ante rather than
putting the burden on others ex post, as was the case under the central claim-
ing system. In designing their own inventions, patentees generally will have
made significant investments in researching the technologies that already
exist in the field. Patentees are thus not only the most intimately acquainted
with their own inventions but also possess the requisite information on the
technical nature of those inventions and exactly what they have contributed
to the field.2 19 Accordingly, a patentee's information costs ex ante are gener-
ally much lower than those of a court or the public ex post. To the extent that
we have decided to make patent claiming rule-like in its public-notice ef-
fects, patentees are best able to bear the burden of specifying ex ante the
boundaries of their patents. 220
Patent claims may specify too much up front, however. Again, claims
describe inventive ideas that are highly conceptual, complex, and unique and
do so in ways that must carefully distinguish all previously known ideas.
The resulting claims often become quite complicated, placing a significant
burden on the public and the courts to understand what those claims mean.
As noted above, the more complicated a rule or standard, the greater the
costs of understanding it.
Such complexity will not necessarily impair the efficiency of a rule or
standard, however, if the relevant public already possesses the necessary
private information or field-specific knowledge. 221 This is believed to be the
case with regard to patent claims. Patents are generally thought to be most
relevant to those working in the same technological field as the claimed in-
vention. Patentees therefore are supposed to draft their claims so that a
person having ordinary skill in the art ("PHOSITA") would be able to com-
prehend the claims without undue difficulty. Similarly, a court tasked with
interpreting a patent claim should also do so from the perspective of a
PHOSITA.
For all the benefits of drafting claims as rules in order to provide greater
certainty ex ante, however, patent claim drafters must still contend with a
218. Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481,
547 (1996).
219. Long, supra note 24, at 468.
220. See Craswell, supra note 218.
221. See Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, II J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 150, 151 (1995); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 577, 609 (1988).
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number of factors that ultimately cause a great deal of uncertainty in patent
boundaries. As discussed above, the novelty of patent ideas means that in-
ventors cannot simply refer to previous ideas or categories in drafting their
patent claims. A second and perhaps more onerous obstacle to certainty is
the unforeseeability of future events that those patent claims will be expected
to address. Herein lies the crux of viewing patent claims as rules, for the spec-
trum between rules and standards revolves very much around anticipating
future events ex ante versus coping with unforeseen events ex post.222 Future
technological developments are unpredictable, so to the extent that patent
claims adopt some more standard-like qualities, they mitigate the problems
posed by unforeseeability.
To appreciate this, one need only look at the relative merits of patent
claims as rules of exclusion versus their merits as rules of governance. The
concept of patents as rules of exclusion-as property metes and bounds-
assumes a relatively static res. The value of that property res might vary
over time, but the physical things that constitute the res themselves general-
ly do not.223 Patent claims as rules of governance, on the other hand, do not
necessarily assume any such static existence around which the behavior to
be governed will center. Rather, the behavior to be governed is identified not
by some static tangible good but by some harm to avoid or benefit to
achieve. These benefits or harms can be expected to vary over time as situa-
tions and even categorization (as "harmful" or "beneficial") may change
over time.
Rules of governance are believed to be more costly to draft than rules of
exclusion, moreover, because one must specify the resources that may be
used as well as how they may be used in a way that achieves optimal alloca-
tive efficiency.224 For example, a rule of exclusion would constrain trespass
on a property in a more or less absolute fashion. In contrast, a rule of gov-
ernance would constrain alleged nuisances in a more qualified fashion,
taking into account the relative cost of avoidance, the net social value, and
any other costs and benefits as between the alleged nuisance and quiet en-
joyment of the property. 225
Balancing cost-benefit ratios in this way is more information-intensive
and costly than rules of exclusion. Rules of governance require investment in
evaluating which uses to regulate and how to communicate those regulations
in a way that is easily accessible to the affected parties. Also, the affected par-
ties must invest in learning the rules and then in determining how those rules
222. See Kaplow, supra note 203, at 307-11 (and sources cited therein); see also supra
text accompanying notes 201-203.
223. Of course, it can be argued that real property boundaries are simply another form of
rule-making and hence "rules" of exclusion, as they are simply an ex ante demarcation be-
tween legal conduct or use and trespass as illegal conduct or use. See Smith, supra note 12, at
1744-45, 1784-85, 1793, 1796-97, 1800.
224. Id.
225. Fromer, supra note 24, at 729; Smith, supra note 12, at 1746.
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might apply to their particular circumstances. The more complex and numer-
ous the rules, the greater these various costs.226
That is not to say that patent claims are inherently uncertain simply
because they are rules of governance as well as rules of exclusion. Uncer-
tainty about legal outcomes arises for a variety of reasons, most of which
relate to the information costs of anticipating the future.2 7 Perhaps one of
the most challenging obstacles to efficient legal drafting is anticipating all
the contingencies that can arise over time. The vicissitudes of time and
changes in economics and technology can be impossible to predict, particu-
larly where those potential changes are large in number and distant in
time.228 Attempting to provide for all possible contingencies could cause
drafting and transaction costs to approach infinity.229 Those who draft rules
will most efficiently invest only in clarifying their meaning and anticipating
contingencies where the marginal costs do not exceed the expected returns
in clarity and protection. 230
The prohibitively high information costs of anticipating every possible
contingency therefore regularly lead to incompleteness in rule drafting.231 As
noted above, even bright-line rules are porous at their edges. 232 When rules
are unable to address unforeseeable future events, those who must apply the
rules may need to interpret them according to their spirit rather than their
letter to maintain their original purpose. To this extent, rules such as patent
claims may need to be interpreted as more similar to standards than pure
bright-line rules. 233
Patent claims in particular must contend with at least three types of un-
foreseeability. One source of uncertainty, as mentioned above, is the fact
that references to previously unrecognized but potentially invalidating prior
art may be presented at any point during a patent's lifetime.234 Beyond this
possibility, however, there is also the unforeseeability of future technologi-
cal developments that might change the meaning of the claims and what they
cover.235 There is also the unforeseeability of the ways in which any alleged
226. Newman, supra note 12, at 66, 78-79, 81.
227. See Hadfield, supra note 9, at 547.
228. See id. at 547-48.
229. Posner, supra note 30, at 1582 ("[P]erfect foresight is infinitely costly, so that, as
the economic literature on contract interpretation emphasizes, the costs of foreseeing and
providing for every possible contingency that may affect the costs of performance to either
party over the life of the contract are prohibitive.").
230. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 545 (2003); Eric A. Posner, The Parole Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning
Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 540-41
(1998).
231. See Hadfield, supra note 9, at 547-48.
232. Id. at 546; Johnston, supra note 9, at 345.
233. See Landry, supra note 84, at 92-93.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 143-145, 148-151.
235. Kesan & Banik, supra note 53, at 31-32.
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infringers will inevitably try to find loopholes in a patent's claims. 236 The
following takes a closer look at each of these latter two contingencies in
turn and how they affect the certainty with which patent claims can be
drafted and interpreted.
First, the nature of technology means that the future of any given
invention is inevitably uncertain. 237 An inventor may have difficulty gauging
whether any other inventors will enter her same field and overlap or compete
with her invention, how subsequent inventors might improve upon her
invention, and even whether her invention will have any market value. 238
Technology often changes so quickly that even within the relatively short
twenty-year lifespan of a patent, a claimed invention may become relevant
in ways its inventor never expected, or it may become obsolete.13 9 The value
of technological ideas may vary wildly, not only over time but also across
inventions. Some inventions, such as NTP's, may be worth millions and
even billions of dollars, but the vast majority of patented ideas will be worth
nothing.24 0
Similarly, the meaning of technical terminology may evolve over time
along with the technology it describes, thereby changing the meaning of
patent claims in unexpected ways. 24' The courts expressly acknowledge this
fact by requiring that claim language be interpreted by its meaning at
different times, depending on whether the claim is being evaluated for obvi-
ousness, novelty, definiteness, infringement, enablement, and so on.2 42 To
understand this, one need only consider how much the term "computer" has
changed over time. Decades ago, "computers" were necessarily huge con-
catenations of processors that used punch cards and filled entire rooms.
Today, we understand "computers" to be laptops, handheld devices, desk-
tops, and even computers small enough to be implanted in the human eye.243
How can a patentee drafting claims during the era of punch cards write
those claims such that they still have meaning twenty years later during an
era of floppy disks and hard drives?
Second, the scope of a patent claim is uncertain because of the variety
of ways in which others might unwittingly or intentionally reproduce the
236. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1752-53 (noting litigators' skills in exploiting
ambiguities).
237. Smith, supra note 12, at 1744-45, 1784-85, 1793, 1796-97, 1800.
238. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1782 ("But peripheral claiming stands this custody
on its head, purporting to set forth the maximal boundary of the patent grant during the appli-
cation process, before the measure of the inventor's contribution or the different variants that
competitors might adopt can be properly assessed.").
239. Burk & Lemley. supra note 125, at 1591; Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1782.
240. Lemley, supra note 20, at 1053.
241. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 67; Lemley, supra note 7, at 105-10;
Schwartz, supra note 13, at 260.
242. Lemley, supra note 7, passim.
243. Paul Adams, This Is the Smallest Computer Ever, POPULAR Sci. (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-02/smallest-computer-ever.
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idea behind an invention. Patentees will generally endeavor to draft claims
that expressly cover all foreseeable but insignificant variations on their
claimed inventions, but those variations are limited only by the ingenuity of
potential infringers. 2" The costs of drafting against all potentially infringing
variations quickly become prohibitive. As a result, patent claim language
will inevitably contain inadvertent ambiguities and other loopholes that ac-
cused infringers can exploit in an effort to avoid liability. Given that these
loophole cases are the most likely to be litigated, the courts and the public
are most likely to notice those patents in which there is some uncertainty as
to the scope of the claims.
Why are the costs of drafting against such loopholes prohibitive? As
those most familiar with their inventive concepts, patentees are presumably
in the best position to anticipate how those concepts might later be infringed
and to draft more precise patent claims accordingly. The optimal precision
of a rule depends on the variety of activities to which the rule may apply,
however, and even patentees cannot possibly anticipate everything.
To understand the patentee's dilemma, one must consider the cost-
benefit ratio that every patentee faces in drafting his or her patent claims.
The more predictable the particular type of patent infringement, the more
the patentee can efficiently draft precise patent claims that would prohibit
such infringement.2 45 Where the range of possible infringing activities is
heterogeneous and the probability of any single type of infringement is low,
however, the expected benefits of drafting claims covering such infringe-
ment are fewer. In fact, a patent claim drafter may rationally omit reference
to an unlikely type of infringement altogether in the interests of efficiency
and brevity.
Patent infringement does indeed follow the latter pattern. The ways in
which potential infringers may effectively copy a patented idea are both het-
erogeneous and infinite in variety. The patent system is all about inventive
new ideas, and this applies with no less force to new ways of using another's
original idea than to inventing original ideas in the first place. And again,
most patent infringement is inadvertent and merely the side effect of good
faith efforts by fellow inventors to develop their own original ideas, often in
an industry-wide push in the same direction as the patented idea.246 The re-
sulting infringement is frequently the same inventive idea but with the
infringer's own creative slant.
As a result, patent claims suffer the same incompleteness as any other
rule in the same situation. For example, could NTP have anticipated in 1991
that, less than twenty years later, email users would be downloading and
244. Doug Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to Meurer
and Nard, 93 GEO. L.J. 2013, 2026 (2005).
245. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1781-82; see also Kaplow, supra note 203, at
309; Kaplow, supra note 76, at 563.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 196-198.
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sending their messages wirelessly, using multipurpose devices like laptops,
tablets, and smartphones to do so? Probably not. And yet according to NTP,
all of these technologies infringe the inventive idea for which it first filed
back in 1991 for patent protection. 247 True, some of these separately devel-
oped variations on patented ideas may be so unique and inventive as to be
separately patentable themselves, but as long as they overlap with the earlier
patented idea, they could very well infringe on the original inventor's
idea.2 48
While it is incumbent upon patent drafters to try to anticipate as many
of these overlapping variations as possible, their ability to do so is limited.
Just as the costs of describing every possible embodiment of an inventive
idea are impossibly high, so too are the costs of describing every possible
variation. NTP could no more have described every single conceptual varia-
tion on its wireless email concept, such as RIM's BlackBerry or even
AT&T's and Motorola's subsequently developed smartphone systems, than
it could have described each possible way of physically embodying such
systems.2 49 Claim drafters cannot be expected to describe physical embodi-
ments or conceptual variations that were unforeseeable and perhaps not even
possible at the time of drafting, just as they cannot be expected to anticipate
the emergence of unknown prior art, future changes in language, or other
unforeseeable contingencies.
Rather, those who draft rules such as patent claims will most efficiently
invest in both clarifying meaning and anticipating contingencies only when
it provides a benefit in guiding courts and other parties in interpreting and
understanding those rules. 25 0 Where a risk of infringement is exceptionally
high, parties will find it worthwhile to invest more in clarifying ambiguities
and anticipating such risks. Where a risk of infringement is lower, drafting
parties may rationally forgo the costs of clarification and save particularly
challenging or unforeseen risks for resolution ex post. Further investments in
clarity and completeness would yield decreasing marginal returns. This is
particularly true when the probability of a particular contingent risk is low
247. Rob Pegoraro, Faster Forvard: NTP Sues Everybody over Alleged Wireless E-Mail
Patents, WASH. POST (July 9, 2010, 3:29 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fasterforward/
2010/07/ntp-sues-worldover wireless e.html.
248. In order to be found infringing, the variation must contain all the same "elements"
or components as, and so must overlap completely with, the claimed invention. The infringing
invention need not be identical to the claimed invention, however, and may have additional
elements that are themselves separately patentable. RIM's patented technology was infringing
because it overlapped with NTP's patents. See supra text accompanying notes 124-128.
249. NTP later filed suit against AT&T and Motorola for allegedly infringing many of
the same patents at issue in the suit with RIM. NTP, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No.
3:2007cv00550 (E.D. Va. Sep. 7, 2007), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/
virginia/vaedce/3:2007cv00550/221676; NTP, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 3:2010cv00471 (E.D.
Va. July 8, 2010), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/virginialvaedce/3:2010cv00471/
255651.
250. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 230, at 545; Posner, supra note 230, at 544.
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relative to the costs of providing for it. The less likely a particular contin-
gency, the less valuable investments are in providing for it.251 We can expect
rational parties to invest in drafting for the most probable or important con-
tingencies first, then the second most probable or important, and so on, until
the marginal cost of drafting for an additional contingency exceeds the
expected marginal returns. 252 The resulting rules may be efficient yet incom-
plete and ambiguous.
Another problem in drafting airtight patent claims is that even the most
carefully drafted rules are prone to opportunism. As rules, patent claims limit
themselves only to what they specify, but those specifications are only imper-
fect proxies for effecting the underlying purpose of the rule.253 Patent claims
thus effectively state up front not only what they do cover but also what they
do not cover.254 Even though a patentee may have rationally and efficiently
decided not to invest in drafting against all forms of infringement, it is exactly
these forms that potential infringers will seek out if they want to escape liabil-
ity for free riding on the patent.255 Under such circumstances, the probability
of any given form of infringement may be de minimis, but the sum total odds
of some type of infringement can approach infinity, particularly if the under-
lying inventive concept is valuable. The costs of drafting against all such
contingencies are clearly prohibitive. 256
In this way patent claims, like tax codes, are particularly subject to op-
portunistic exploitation of ambiguities to avoid liability.257 A taxpayer will
use loopholes to avoid paying taxes, and the patent infringer will use loop-
holes to free ride on the patent, to avoid infringement liability, or to try to
invalidate the patent. In fact, inventors should expect that potential infring-
ers, or at least their legal counsel, will affirmatively look for such
loopholes. 258 While the patent drafter has to anticipate and try to cover all
251. Scott & Triantis, supra note 66, at 819; Posner, supra note 30, at 1584, 1610.
252. Meurer & Nard, supra note 90, at 1952; see also Kaplow, supra note 76, at 563
("Designing a rule that accounts for every relevant contingency would be wasteful, as most
would never arise."); Posner, supra note 230, at 544.
253. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3
J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258 (1974); Kaplow, supra note 76, at 565; cf Autogiro Co. of Am. v.
United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("An invention exists most importantly as a
tangible structure or a series of drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written
to satisfy the requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to words allows for
unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled.").
254. Rose, supra note 221, at 592.
255. Newman, supra note 12, at 80-81.
256. Fromer, supra note 24, at 757 (noting that while patentees must anticipate all loop-
holes, competitors need to find only one loophole to escape liability); Meurer & Nard, supra
note 90, at 1998; cf. Posner, supra note 30, at 1602 ("[W]hile the probability of a particular
contingency materializing may be slight; the probability that some contingency in what may
be a very extensive array of low-probability events will materialize may be great.").
257. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 95-98 (6th ed. 2003); Rose,
supra note 221, at 592, 596-99.
258. Rose, supra note 221, at 592.
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possible embodiments of, variations on, and risks of invalidation of their
inventive ideas, potential infringers have to find only one loophole to
circumvent all of the drafter's precautions. 259 The owner of a valuable patent
therefore cannot rely on being protected against all comers, creating uncer-
tainty as to the patent's value.
In this way, patents again differ starkly from real property. Real proper-
ty rights, of course, also suffer from the uncertainty of unforeseen events. 260
Real property rights may be affected by unexpected zoning changes, envi-
ronmental issues, nuisances, and even servitudes. But all of these tend to be
less frequent and less surprising than unforeseen contingencies relating to
patented inventions, largely because of the relatively static nature of real
property.2 61 Moreover, real property regimes typically employ a variety of
measures to protect against such unexpected events, such as zoning laws and
variances, limitations on cognizable servitudes, the sic utere doctrine, and
other quiet enjoyment doctrines. 262 Patented inventive concepts, by contrast,
enjoy no such protections.
Unlike patented ideas, which are often feared as monopolistic excep-
tions to what would ideally be a free exchange of ideas, quiet enjoyment of
real property is viewed as a basic right of ownership. Whereas interferences
with quiet enjoyment of real property are seen as nuisances or trespasses, in
patent law they are seen as competition to be encouraged except in cases of
infringement. This distinction is consistent with the overarching differences
in the purposes of the patent system and real property regimes. While real
property rights are upheld as fundamental to personhood as well as a free-
market economy, patent rights are considered an "embarrassment" to
competition.2 63 Patent drafters are left to their own hard luck if they fail to
protect their inventive ideas from interference by others.
That is not to say that patentees have no protective measures in their
arsenal. Functional and conceptual claiming, for example, can be useful in
addressing exactly these kinds of contingencies. Describing an inventive
idea by its conceptual and functional relationships rather than by its physical
characteristics allows claim drafters to explain in real terms why unknown
future technology might infringe on the patented idea. By expressly setting
forth those defining characteristics, patent claim drafters can protect them-
selves to some extent against changes in technology or terminology not
necessarily relevant to their inventive idea or how others might infringe the
patent. Functional and conceptual claiming in many ways increases the clar-
ity of patent boundaries because it hones in on what constitutes
259. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1752-53; Meurer & Nard, supra note 90, at 1975
(cited in Fromer, supra note 24, at 757).
260. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 152, at 76.
261. Duffy, supra note 12, at 1085.
262. Newman, supra note 12, at 106-07.
263. Carter, supra note 140, at 716-18.
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infringement of a patent rather than merely approximating it by describing
embodiments. As explained above, however, conceptual characteristics are
still unavoidably abstract and cannot be easily observed or measured, creat-
ing uncertainty.26 And drafters must still use language to describe even the
most functional and conceptual of characteristics, leaving them and their
patents subject to the inconstancy of language as technology and usage
evolve over time.
In fact, a number of critics charge that patentees intentionally draft not
just abstract but strategically vague claims in the hopes that they can parlay
that ambiguity into greater patent scope later should the claims need to be
construed in the course of litigation. 265 This is undoubtedly true for some
small number of patent claim drafters, for the greater a patent's scope, the
more valuable the patent may become. But the larger truth is that much
"vague" claim language is not strategic gaming but rather, for all the reasons
explained above, simply the patentee's good faith effort to protect her in-
ventive ideas against an uncertain future. 266 A patentee's best interests lie in
avoiding such uncertainty, which hinders licensing and investment decisions
and otherwise throws the value of patents into doubt.
Patentees have other reasons to avoid uncertainty, primarily due to the
risk of invalidity. The Patent Act requires that patents, in an adequately de-
tailed and "definite" manner, fully enable the PHOSITA to make and use the
claimed invention. Patent claims that fail to meet either requirement are con-
sidered invalid.267 Claims that may be interpreted too broadly are also at much
greater risk of running afoul of invalidating prior art references. Patentees
need to differentiate their claimed inventions from known technologies in
their art, and this often relies on carefully and precisely drawn lines between
the invention's novel contribution to the art and what existed before. If those
lines are too vague, a patentee's claim language could be rejected by the
PTO or, worse, invalidated by a court. In fact, patentees are believed to draft
their claims more narrowly due to fears of unknown but invalidating prior
art references. 268 Often, these prior art references appear only when a highly
motivated defendant digs up the references as part of its defense to alleged
infringement, 269 and the validity of a claim or entire patent in light of those
references could easily depend on how the patent's claims are construed.
264. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 100, 114, 174.
265. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 56-58, 235-53.
266. See, e.g., Letter from Michael K. Kirk, Exec. Dir., American Intellectual Property
Law Association, to The Honorable Robert W. Bahr, Senior Patent Attorney, Office of the
Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy (Apr. 24, 2006), available at
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/aiplarules.pdf (cited in BESSEN & MEURER, supra note
10, at 220).
267. Burk & Lemley, supra note 125, at 1593.
268. Kieff, supra note 47, at 101, 104.
269. Kesan & Banik, supra note 53, at 25; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 152, at 76, 80.
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Much like the use of functional and conceptual claiming to protect
against facile infringement, however, patentees can hedge against both in-
fringement and the risk of invalidity through multiple-claim drafting
techniques. Multiple-claim drafting allows patentees to cover their inventive
ideas through pyramidally organized independent and dependent claims of
varying breadth.270 As a result, if and when a broader version of a claim on
an inventive idea is invalidated, patentees will at least still retain rights over
the remaining narrower versions.' Sacrificing patent scope by narrowing
one's claims further reduces the chances that a patentee will inadvertently,
and invalidly, draft claims that cover prior art.27 2 Even the most strategic
form of multiple claiming will not provide complete insurance against un-
known but invalidating prior art, though. Risk-averse patentees will
therefore tend to draft their patent claims conservatively.
Although most patentees may not intentionally draft ambiguous patent
claims, the abstraction and novelty of inventive ideas, combined with the
unforeseeability of the future, mean that patent claims will inevitably be
both incomplete and uncertain. When the potential forms of trespass vary
greatly, particularly over time, devising a rule ex ante to govern those
activities will be not only costly but also inefficient. Patentees and other
rule-drafters in similar circumstances may rationally rely on courts to
resolve unaddressed contingencies ex post.273 In fact, for many such rule-
drafters, postponing resolution of many issues can be beneficial because the
necessary information will not become available until later.
This is particularly true for patent claims. The nature of technological
progress is such that circumstances will change rapidly over time, particu-
larly if the invention at issue is pioneering. 274 The other technologies
potentially infringing patent claims are often so heterogeneous that vital
information about those activities may be more efficiently collected post
hoc. And the necessary information about those other technologies typically
will lie in the hands of alleged infringers, who will make it available only
when ordered by a court. Many commentators consider relying on ex post
resolution to be more efficient on many issues, including validity, because
those issues are too information-intensive to resolve efficiently at the draft-
ing and examination stage.275
Postponing certain issues until later makes drafting parties more depend-
ent on courts, however, and it subjects them to the court's potential errors in
resolving an issue.276 And while patentees may efficiently postpone complete
270. Fromer, supra note 24, at 758 (and citations therein).
271. Meurer & Nard, supra note 90, at 1975; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112, 13 (2006) (al-
lowing multiple dependent claiming).
272. Kieff, supra note 47, at 101, 104.
273. Rose, supra note 221, at 600.
274. Long, supra note 24, at 512-13.
275. Kieff, supra note 47, at 73.
276. Posner, supra note 30, at 1583-84, 1588; Scott & Triantis, supra note 66, at 820.
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resolution of patent scope until litigation, the courts charged with determining
patent scope under such circumstances face their own cost-benefit analyses in
struggling to achieve optimal outcomes. Most importantly, courts must figure
out how to deal with the unaddressed contingencies in patent claims and
with the inevitable incompleteness they create.
The case law illustrates how the courts have struggled mightily with pa-
tent claim construction but have yet to devise a unified body of construction
canons that yield consistent results. Given the inherently uncertain nature of
patent claims, one can hardly blame the courts for being unable to interpret
them with certainty. Some of the obstacles to predictable patent claim inter-
pretation are simply unavoidable; the esoteric nature of the technologies
claimed and the inherent limitations of language both hinder non-specialist
courts in their efforts to interpret patent claims. 277
Analyzing patent claims through a claims-as-rules framework provides
some insight on uncertainty in patent claim construction. Courts' difficulties
with claim construction may stem, in part, from their failure to appreciate
how patent claims deviate from the ideal rule. The resulting confusion has
produced a mishmash of interpretive approaches that seem to ignore the
shortcomings of patent claims as rules and create their own brand of uncer-
tainty.
To understand this problem, one need only look at the modern canons of
claim construction. 278 The federal district courts are given the discretion to
construe patent claims in a mini-hearing called a Markman hearing. 279
Courts may hold a Markman hearing at any point in the trial that they see fit,
even if that point occurs before discovery has been conducted. 280 The word-
ing of the claim should then be given its "plain and ordinary meaning" as
understood by a PHOSITA, unless something in the patent demonstrates that
the patentee intended to assign some other, more specialized meaning to a
particular term.281
Under this approach, judges would simply have to familiarize them-
selves with the relevant technology and terminology in order to be led to the
"correct" interpretation of patent claims. If patent claims were clear on their
face like ideal rules, this procedure would be fairly straightforward. But
patent claims are seldom clear, especially by the time the meaning of a
patent claim is being litigated. Construing claims through techniques better
suited for bright-line rules therefore just causes more problems.
277. Fromer, supra note 24, at 758; see also Kaplow, supra note 76, at 562-63;
Schwartz, supra note 13, at 259.
278. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1753-61.
279. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Moore, supra note
14, at 7-8.
280. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1759; Cotropia, supra note 47, at 71; Moore, su-
pra note 14, at 28.
281. Burk & Lemley, supra note 5, at 33; Moore, supra note 14, at 28.
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For example, construing patent claims during a Markman hearing be-
fore the presentation of evidence or even compulsion of discovery deprives
the court of information necessary to understand the claims. In fact, patent
claim construction is often so information-intensive that courts have been
known to modify their initial interpretations in light of new information
presented later at trial.282 Likewise, interpreting patent claims through the
eyes of the relevant PHOSITA is a great idea on its face, but the PHOSITA
is an uncertain lodestar itself. From what time period should a court draw its
PHOSITA? What specialized knowledge can we expect the PHOSITA to
have? And what would a PHOSITA understand a claim to mean if it de-
scribes an inventive idea that is novel and therefore never seen or even
imagined by any PHOSITA? All of these are highly context-dependent ques-
tions that defy easy answers.283
Perhaps the most rule-oriented of the construction canons is the re-
quirement that claims be interpreted according to their "plain and ordinary"
meaning. Does the word "computer" have a plain and ordinary meaning? Do
any words, including simple ones like "a," "or," "to," "on," "about," "includ-
ing," and "through"? 284 Or are they all context-dependent, such that they
may vary in definition not only according to how they are used in a claim
but also at what point in time the claim is being construed? For purposes of
determining infringement, a claim's meaning is interpreted as of the time of
the alleged infringement, which will vary from accused infringer to accused
infringer.285 To suggest that a claim term might possess a permanent "plain
and ordinary" meaning flies in the face of how language is actually used and
understood. Not surprisingly, under such confusing guidance, the trial courts
and the Federal Circuit have developed a multitude of differing, often con-
flicting approaches to interpretation. 286
Perhaps the greatest drawback to treating patent claims purely as rules
is that such treatment risks losing sight of the purpose of patent claims.
Patent claims, like all rules, are often limited in their ability to effect the
underlying purpose of the rule when they are unable to address all the con-
tingencies to which they will be applied. Rules are inevitably incomplete in
such situations. 287 This is why some ingenious taxpayers continue to find
loopholes in the tax codes and why other hapless individuals are held liable
282. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpre-
tive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1055-56 (2007) (and sources cited therein).
283. See generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1755; Golden, supra note 14, pas-
Sim.
284. Burk & Lemley, supra note 5, at 53.
285. Lemley, supra note 7, at 109-10.
286. See generally R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeed-
ing? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004)
(examining the Federal Circuit's differing interpretive approaches); Miller, supra note 155, at
182 (noting increasing rates of dissents on claim construction).
287. Rose, supra note 221. at 592.
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in situations where a sense of fairness or efficiency might dictate otherwise.
Both false-negative and false-positive types of mismatch blunt the ability of
rules to incentivize desirable behavior and deter undesirable behavior.S8
Applying rules as if they were optimal manages to be both under- and over-
inclusive.
The unpredictability of the future in technological and scientific fields,
changes in language over time, and even the difficulty of describing techno-
logical concepts through the written word all suggest that courts should
interpret patent claims as both rules and standards. In fact, a few commenta-
tors suggest that we should abandon the peripheral patent claiming system
altogether and instead invest in a more standard-like claiming approach as a
way to improve the efficiency and fairness of the patent system. 9 But how
can courts justify such treatment? The more standard-like central claiming
system has long since been rejected as creating too much uncertainty, par-
ticularly within the patents-as-property paradigm of patent claiming.29 0 Even
if we view patent claims as both rules of exclusion and rules of governance,
that is not the same as saying that patent claims should be interpreted as
standards rather than rules. Rules of governance do have much in common
with standards, for governance rules often allow for the same balancing of
interests and context-dependence. Even so, they are still rules. 291
Nonetheless, the courts' overall approach to interpreting patent claims
appears to be consistent with the view that patent claims are not only rules
of governance but also incomplete rules. If nothing else, the various possible
canons of construction that the courts have not adopted are instructive. If
certainty in patent claim meaning were truly the primary goal of modem
patent claim construction, there are a number of bright-line techniques that
the courts could employ. The courts could simply place the burden of uncer-
tainty on one party or the other through interpretive approaches such as the
doctrine of contra proferentern.2 92 Under this doctrine, patentees would bear
all responsibility for the fact that their claims are not complete, and any un-
addressed contingencies would automatically be ceded to potential
infringers as liability-free loopholes. This principle w'ould provide both
courts and potential infringers with greater certainty at the expense of the
patentee: if something is not clearly in the patent claim, it does not belong to
288. Id. at 596-601.
289. See generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 7 (discussing the costs and benefits of
returning to a more central-claiming-like approach to patenting); Fromer, supra note 24 (ad-
vocating central claiming and claiming by exemplar in patent law); see also Jonathan L.
Moore, A Patent Panacea? The Promise of Corbinized Claim Construction, 9 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 1 (2009) (advocating more subjective approaches to claim construction).
290. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1745; Fromer, supra note 24, at 731-35.
291. Cf Smith, supra note 12, at 1744-46, 1784-85 (noting the characteristics of gov-
ernance rules).
292. Golden, supra note 14, at 324 n.14.
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the patentee.29 3 Alternatively, patent courts had previously construed claims to
avoid invalidating the original patent and thereby undermining the patentee's
expectations. This tends to favor the patentee over the alleged infringer.2 94
Modern courts have been reluctant to employ either interpretive approach,
however, opting instead to spotlight other goals such as equity.2 95
The case law on patent claim construction suggests that the courts un-
derstand the shortcomings of treating patent claims purely as rules. The
courts have therefore adopted interpretive canons that treat patent claims
less like pure rules and more like mixtures of rules and standards. A simple
standard may more efficiently provide the necessary flexibility to address
unpredictable events without sacrificing the predictability that could not
have been achieved in such circumstances anyway.2 96 A standard may also
be better suited because the events themselves may provide the information
necessary to determine culpability.2 97
These latter, more standard-like canons thus may address many of the
inherent uncertainties in patent claiming in a way more commensurate with
the purposes of the patent system and with equity.2 98 Such equitable con-
cerns are palpable, if not necessarily expressed, in other ways that courts
construe patent claims. On the one hand, burdening subsequent inventors
with liability for infringing another's patent even though they created utility
of their own is often unfair and perhaps not in the best interests of society.
On the other hand, failing to protect patentees against significant incursions
is inequitable and may discourage innovation. And because patenting an
invention may hinder further improvements and competition (in the form of
copying), the law relies on all the patentability criteria to prevent patents
that may harm not only subsequent technological progress but also competi-
tion within the market. 299
293. Bradley D. Liggett, Contra Applicantem or Contra Proferentem Applicatio: The
Need for Clarification of the Doctrine of Contra Proferentem in the Context of Insured-
Created Ambiguities in Insurance Applications, 2008 BYU L. REv. 211, 214 n. I (and
sources cited therein); Cameron W. Ellis, Toward a Nuanced Plain Language Approach in
Federal Contract Interpretation: What Do Bell BCI, States Roofing, and Lai Services Imply?,
39 PuB. CONT. L.J. 821, 827-28 (2010); cf Rose, supra note 221, at 592 (noting that empha-
sis on certainty ex ante often means penalizing the drafter).
294. Molly Silfen, Claim Interpretation Recommendations for the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals in Phillips v. AWH, 14 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 47, 73 (2005).
295. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc); see also Golden, supra note 14, at 324 n.14; Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers &
Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Frame-
work, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 765 (2010); Silfen, supra note 294, at 74.
296. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 253, at 273-74 (noting that drafting costs increase
even more when rules have to be modified to meet changes over time).
297. See supra text accompanying notes 274-276; see also Kaplow, supra note 76, at
562-63.
298. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1327-28; see also Golden, supra note 14, at 324
n.14; Menell, Powers & Carlson, supra note 295, at 765; Silfen, supra note 294, at 74.
299. Barton, supra note 53, at 456-57; Kesan & Banik, supra note 53, at 29.
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According to the courts, none of these rationales is a legitimate reason
to interpret any particular claim in any particular way every time. But they
are compelling concerns that may nonetheless influence a court's choice to
emphasize one interpretive approach in one case while emphasizing a dif-
ferent approach in another case. For example, commentators have noted that
the courts will change the meaning of defined patent law terms such as
"means," "consisting of," or "comprising," if the results would otherwise be
absurd. 300 The judiciary's awareness of the difficulties of drafting airtight
patent claims is yet another reason that patent claim meaning is often uncer-
tain.30'
Equitable concerns also expressly influence the way courts interpret
patent claims. In particular, courts sometimes choose to compensate for un-
foreseen contingencies by interpreting patent claims as standards rather than
rules.3 02 Laws usually do not exist in clear rule or standard format and in-
stead exhibit characteristics of both.303 Courts in infringement cases may
therefore resort to the "doctrine of equivalents," a standard that allows
courts to find infringement even when the accused technology does not lie
within the literal scope of a patent claim but nevertheless is the "equivalent"
of the claimed invention in the way that it functions, the means it uses, and
the results it yields.30 Even though patentees may not have invested the
foresight (or the clairvoyance, in the case of equivalent technologies not
even invented until after the patent was drafted) to claim expressly all equiv-
alents of their patented innovations, they can still enjoy protection against
such infringement with the assistance of the courts.
Many commentators and jurists have complained that the doctrine of
equivalents injects too much uncertainty into patent claim scope,30' but per-
haps such uncertainty is somewhat beneficial. By discouraging exploitation
of loopholes in patent claims, the doctrine of equivalents may deter oppor-
tunism in a way that ultimately increases overall social welfare. 3 Similarly,
the means-plus-function format allowed under section 112, paragraph 6 of
the Patent Act allows patentees to describe an element of their inventive idea
by its function rather than its structure and, later, to claim patent scope over
anything structurally equivalent to examples of that element.307 Equivalence
through means-plus-function claiming is more limited than equivalence under
the doctrine of equivalents, but both serve similar purposes in allowing courts
300. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1793-94.
301. Landry, supra note 84, at 92-93.
302. Johnston, supra note 9, at 364.
303. Rose, supra note 221, at 593.
304. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1772; see also Smith, supra note 12, at 1807.
305. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 61-62; Meurer & Nard, supra note
90, passim.
306. Rose, supra note 221, at 600.
307. Lemley, supra note 7, at 107-08; Meurer & Nard, supra note 90, at 1975.
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more equitable discretion in how they interpret and apply patent claims. 308 In
particular, both means-plus-function claiming and the doctrine of equiva-
lents treat patent claims more like standards and less like pure rules, an
approach more in keeping with the various differences between patent
claims and ideal rules.
CONCLusIoN
While desirable, certainty in patent claims and other rules comes at a
cost and may be impossible to achieve.31 Patent claims by their nature will
inevitably be more uncertain in their "boundaries" than real property bound-
aries. As such, it seems odd that so many critics state that the patent system
is necessarily failing simply because patent boundaries are less certain than
real property boundaries.
There are too many differences between the patent system and real
property regimes to equate the two legal systems. Indeed, patents might bet-
ter be described as rules of governance that define the contours of desirable
and undesirable behavior instead of the metes and bounds of a property res.
In the end, patent claims are undoubtedly a little of both, however: property
boundaries in that they define near-absolute rights of exclusion over an in-
ventive idea, but rules of governance in that they affect others' rights to use
that inventive idea. And regardless of how we characterize patent claims, we
must be cognizant of why they are inevitably uncertain in their meaning and
boundaries. The conceptual and unavoidably abstract nature of patent
claims, the desired novelty of the patent res, and the unpredictability of fu-
ture technology all mean that patent claims can never neatly establish
expectations ex ante the way an ideal rule might.
Instead, patents are best interpreted as a combination of rules and stand-
ards, designed for public notice but limited by equitable concerns that
hinder the clarity of that notice. This has implications for how courts should
interpret patent claims. Interpretive methods that simply assume that patent
claims are rules will run into problems and even create uncertainty them-
selves. Interpretive methods that are designed for blends between rules and
standards, on the other hand, could be a suitable fit for patent claims. Ap-
proaches such as means-plus-function claiming and the doctrine of
equivalents may therefore be much more useful than currently appreciated.
The analysis here is by no means an argument that our current patent
system is perfect or even that it is working well. Many legitimate complaints
can be and have been made about the patent system, including complaints
308. Intellectual Sci. & Tech. Inc. v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 589 F.3d I179, 1183 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
309. Hadfield, supra note 9, at 546; Jason S. Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Finding and Effi-
ciency: Toward an Economic Theory of Liability Under Uncertainty, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 137
passim (1987).
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about patents granted on obvious or already well-known technology, or
about patents used to hold up important social welfare advances such as
breast cancer detection and treatment.3 0 Nor is this Article intended to be a
conclusive analysis of the patent system. Without specifically addressing
any particular industry affected by patent law and without further empirical
support, the conclusions offered are necessarily preliminary and tentative.
The analysis here argues only that any particular focus on patent claims and
claim construction as a way to improve the overall function of the patent
system must look beyond the real property analogy and take into account
the particular features of the patent system.
310. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 13, passim.
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